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INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Use of trickery or deceit in the questioning of criminal suspects is a staple of current police interrogation practices. The
prevalence of this technique is attested to not only by its frequent
appearance in reported cases,' but also, and perhaps more signifif Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965, University of
Pennsylvania. I am particularly indebted to Professor Yale Kamisar of the University
of Michigan Law School for his interest, his guidance (including the many helpful
suggestions he made upon reading an earlier draft of this Article), and his legal
writings that have illuminated this area of the law for the past two decades. I am
also indebted to Professor Louis B. Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School for his helpful criticism on an earlier draft of this Article, and to David
Cicola, a third year student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for his
excellent research assistance.
1
In three of the most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the admissibility
of confessions, it appears that the confessions were obtained at least in part by
police trickery. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (confession obtained
after deeply religious murder suspect heard "Christian burial" speech); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (confession obtained after police
falsely told suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of the crime);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (confession obtained after police falsely
told suspect that another suspect had named him as the gunman). In Williams, the
police trickery was not discussed because the Court found a violation of the suspect's
sixth amendment right to counsel. 430 U.S. at 397-98. In Mathiason and Mosley,
the Court noted that the validity of the police conduct was not within the scope of
its review. 429 U.S. at 495-96; 423 U.S. at 99. For recent lower court cases in
which it appears that police trickery was utilized to obtain confessions, see, for
example, United States ex -rel.Galloway v. Fogg, 403 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(police misrepresented to the suspect the extent to which other persons had implicated him); Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 523
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1975) (police falsely told murder suspect that murder weapon
had been recovered); State v. Cobb, 115 Ariz. 484, 566 P.2d 285 (1977) (police
falsely told robbery suspect that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the
crime); People v. Groleau, 44 Ill. App. 3d 807, 358 N.E.2d 1192 (1976) (police
falsely told murder suspect that victim was still alive).
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candy, by the central importance it is given in police interrogation
manuals.2 For example, Inbau and Reid's widely-read manual,
CriminalInterrogationand Confessions,3 outlines twenty-six specific
techniques to be used in interrogating a suspect; - most of these
techniques will inevitably involve some form of deception because
they require an officer to make statements that he knows are untrue
or to play a role that is inconsistent with his actual feelings. 5 The
effectiveness of these techniques is amply documented by the authors as they recount case after case in which a strategic lie or a
timely false show of sympathy was instrumental in leading a suspect
to confess. 6
A conscientious police officer (or one with an unusually high
degree of legal sensitivity) might wonder, however, exactly what, if
any, limit the Constitution places upon the admission of confessions
obtained by deceitful interrogation techniques. If this officer attempted to discover the answer in the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, he would encounter grave difficulties. Dictum in
Mirandav. Arizona 7 indicates that police are precluded from using
trickery to induce a waiver of a suspect's fifth and sixth amendment
rights. 8 Moreover, in applying the established rule that only voluntary statements can be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial,
the Court has excluded confessions obtained through deception 9
and expressed judicial distaste for certain deceptive practices. 10
2

See C:rmNAL
Schroeder 1972); F.

NESTwnGATiN AND INTERRoGAToN (rev. ed. S. Gerber & 0.
INBAU & J. RBm, CnamAL INTERROGATIoN MD CoNFEssIONs

O'HAnA, FuNDA.MNENrALs OF CRvMNAL IvEsTIGATIoN (4th ed.
ScHUTr, THE GENTE ART OF INiawEmwmG AND INTERROC. VAN METER, PRImcIPLEs OF POLICE INTERROGATION (1973).

(2d ed. 1967); C.

1978); F. ROYAL & S.

(1976);
For an indication of the extent to which these tactics are in fact used, see Sterling,
Police Interrogationand the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PUB. L. 25, 41-43, 5257 (1965).
GATON

3 F.

NmAu

& J. REIm, supra note 2.

4 Id. 26-108.
5 For an excellent general discussion of the definition of deception and lying,
see S. BoR, LYINc: MoRAL CnoicE IN Purac L=F (1978).
6 See F. INBAu & J. REmn, supra note 2, at 42, 49.

7384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8Id. 476.
9 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (tape of incriminating statements made to confederate who was acting under cover for prosecution held inadmissible as interrogation violative of fifth and sixth amendments); Spano v. New

York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (lies by police officer who was suspect's childhood friend
were one element in finding that confession was obtained by means violative of due
process); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (confession induced by psychiatrist

who was introduced to the suspect as the medical doctor whom he had requested
held inadmissible as involuntary).

1oSee Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966); Spano v. New York,

360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
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Nevertheless, the conscientious officer would find that the Court
has neither held nor even indicated that any particular type of police
trickery would, in and of itself, render a resulting confession inadmissible.
In the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court,
the conscientious police officer might naturally refer to the principles that are lucidly expressed in the Inbau and Reid police manual. The benchmark to be used in judging the permissibility of
deceptive practices is simply stated: "Although both 'fair' and
'unfair' interrogation practices are permissible, nothing shall be
done or said to the subject that will be apt to make an innocent
person confess." ". Although Inbau and Reid offer no catalogue
of prohibited practices,' 2 the test does provide a clear and direct
focus. At first blush, the test acts as a substantial safeguard for the
innocent suspect; in addition, it is supported by plausible moral and
pragmatic justifications, 13 as well as by considerable state court
authority.' 4
Unfortunately, however, the Inbau-Reid test is not wholly consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. First, the Court's voluntariness standard does not focus solely on the reliability of a particular
confession; rather, it also requires a determination that the means of
obtaining the confession were consistent with our accusatorial
system of criminal justice. 15 Even the guilty person has the right
to demand that his guilt be demonstrated by the State. Therefore,
examination of the "totality of the circumstances" must reveal that
a suspect's statement was "the product of his free and rational
choice." '1 In order to protect more fully the suspect's freedom of
choice, the Court has held that certain coercive interrogation techniques result in an "involuntary" confession as a matter of law,
irrespective of the likelihood that they did or could produce a false
"1F. INBAu & J. REm, supra note 2, at 218.
'2Leaving aside any quibbles one might have with the standard of certainty
provided by the term "apt," neither the test as stated nor the remainder of the
manual informs an interrogating officer of the types of interrogation techniques that
are "apt" (or likely) to induce a false confession.
3. F. INBAU & J.REID, supra note 2, at 217-18.
14 See, e.g., Canada v. State, 56 Ala. App. 722, 725, 325 So. 2d 513, 515 (Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 395, 325 So. 2d 516 (1976) (tricks acceptable unless
"likely" to produce false confessions); R.W. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 668, 671, 218
S.E.2d 674, 676 (1975) ("test in determining voluntariness is whether an inducement, if any, was sufficient, by possibility, to elicit an untrue acknowledgment of
guilt"); Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 315, 237 A.2d 172, 177 (1968) (trick
permissible as long as it has "no tendency to produce a false confession").
15 See notes 83-104 infra & accompanying text.
16 Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968) (per curiam).
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confession and irrespective of their effect on the actual defendant
before the court. Thus, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,17 Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, found that an unbroken thirty-six hour
interrogation was "so inherently coercive that its very existence is
irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom." 18
In addition to the concern for freedom of choice, the modern
voluntariness standard has a fairness component. In Spano v. New
York, 19 for example, the Court expressed concern not only with
excluding confessions obtained by potentially coercive methods but
also with insuring that the police "obey the law while enforcing the
law." 20 The Court's disapproval of the police tactics employed in
Spano and a number of other cases 21 indicates that in deciding
when the police are "obeying the law," the Court will measure the
police conduct against certain basic standards of fairness that are
fundamental to our system of justice. 22 Consequently, even reliable
confessions should be inadmissible when they are induced by modes
of police trickery that are inconsistent with basic notions of fairness.
Moreover, the impact of the fifth and sixth amendments on
police interrogation practices must be considered. Malloy v.
Hogan 23 held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states, and Miranda v. Arizona 2
established that it applies at the stationhouse. Miranda holds that
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation have an absolute right
to remain silent,25 that the police must give them certain warnings

to insure protection of this right, 26 and that a suspect must be
1 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
18 Id. 154.
19 360 U.S. 315 (1959)."
20 Id. 320.
21
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter,
J.) ("Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to police
interrogation . . . is subversive of the accusatorial system."); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 418 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (despite prosecutor's justification of the police procedures as necessary, delaying arraignment and questioning
suspect while he was naked was "so below the standards by which the criminal law

.should be enforced as to fall short of due process of law").
22

See generally Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,

6 STAr. L. BRv. 411, 431 (1954).
23378 U.S. 1 (1964).

24384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25 Id. 444. Of course, in view of the post-Miranda cases, it is by no means
clear that the privilege applies at the station house in all situations. See text accompanying notes 53-62 infra.
26 384 U.S. at 444.
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given a "continuous opportunity" to exercise these rights.27 In
short, Miranda holds that for reasons drawn from the fifth amendment privilege, suspects subjected to custodial interrogation must
be afforded the protection provided by the warnings not only at
the beginning of the interrogation, but also throughout the interrogation process. 28 In addition, the Court's recent holding in
Brewer v. Williams 29 indicates that, quite aside from the protec-

tions provided by Miranda, some suspects subjected to police interrogation have an independent sixth amendment right to an
attorney.30 Accordingly, any police practice that undermines the
protections provided by either Miranda or the sixth amendment
right to an attorney should be constitutionally impermissible.
To summarize, then, an officer who wants to comply with the
constitutional limits on the use of trickery in inducing confessions
must be concerned with more than simply avoiding tricks that are
likely to induce false statements. In addition, he must curb the
use of trickery that has the effect of rendering the resulting confession involuntary or that negates the effect of protections provided by the fifth and sixth amendments.
These general principles, however, do not provide the concrete
guidance needed to determine the legitimacy of particular police
practices. Regrettably, other authoritative sources do not provide
much additional assistance. The draftsmen of the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure considered
the problem of trickery in police interrogation, 1 but failed to issue
any definitive guidelines. The model code currently offers only
general restatements of the existing law,32 and two somewhat cryptic
Id.
The Court was adamant that the suspect be afforded an opportunity to reassert his rights even though he had initially waived them. See text accompanying
notes 44-47 infra. In order to safeguard the suspect's "continuous opportunity" to
change an initial decision not to assert his rights, one state supreme court held that
the warnings must be repeated if the nature of the interrogation process has caused
a dissipation of their effect. See Commonwealth v. Wideman, 460 Pa. 699, 334
A.2d 594 (1975). However, several courts have held that even a break in the
interrogation process of two or three days did not mandate restatement of the warnings. Y. KAaIsiA, W. LAFAvE, & J. IsRAnL, MODERN CanRa _u PROCEDURE 578
(4th ed. 1974).
29430 U.S. 387 (1977).
30 Id. 397-98.
27
28

31 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ABRAIGNmENT PROCEDURE,

§§ 140.2, 140.4, 140.6, 150.2

(Proposed Official Draft, 1975).
32 Id. §§ 140.2 ("No law enforcement officer shall attempt to induce an arrested
person to make a statement by indicating that such person is legally obligated to do
so.") & 140.6 ("No law enforcement officer shall take any action which is designed
to, or which under the circumstances creates a significant risk that it will, result in an
untrue incriminating statement by an arrested person.").
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statements suggesting that statements obtained through the use of
"unfair" police trickery should be inadmissible.38
This cautious approach is certainly understandable. The effect
of police trickery cannot be considered in a vacuum. Trickery
that is relatively innocent in one context might have a devastating
effect on certain suspects when employed in a different setting.
The multiplicity of available interrogation practices renders the
articulation of clear rules extremely difficult. The fact that suspects
possess varying degrees of sensitivity and resistance to deceptive
tactics inevitably hampers the development of a comprehensive approach to the problem. Finally, the subtle messages that can be
communicated through changes in vocal inflection and nonverbal
communication pose a formidable factfinding task for the Court.
These and other problems support the conclusion that it is inappropriate to attempt to promulgate comprehensive guidelines relating to the permissible limits on police trickery in inducing
confessions.4
Nevertheless, there is a need to provide more meaningful
guidance to the police and lower courts. The thesis of this Article
is that it is possible to identify certain interrogation tactics that
are likely to create an unacceptable risk of depriving the suspect
of his constitutional rights. The Article will first examine in
detail the constitutional limitations on the admissibility of confessions, and will introduce a per se approach that strikes a tolerable
balance between the competing interests of predictability and flexibility. The Article will then demonstrate that several widely-used
interrogation tactics should be prohibited on such a per se basis.
The context in which these categories of deception are considered will be primarily one in which the suspect's fifth or sixth
amendment rights, or both, are applicable, but have been validly
33 No law enforcement officer shall attempt to induce an arrested person

to make a statement or otherwise cooperate by . . . (b) any other method
which, in light of the person's age, intelligence and mental and physical
condition, unfairly undermines this ability to make a choice whether to
make a statement or otherwise cooperate.
Id. § 140.4
If a law enforcement officer induces an arrested person to make a statement
in the absence of counsel which deals with matters that are so complex or
confusing that, in light of such person's age, intelligence, and mental and
physical condition, there is a substantial risk that such statement may be
misleading or unreliable or its use may be unfair, such statement shall not
be admitted in evidence against such person in a criminal proceeding.
Id. § 150.2(9)
84 For an elaboration of the reasons in support of this conclusion, see Bator &
Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and Rights to Counsel: Basic Problems
and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLum. L. Ruy. 62, 73-74 (1966).
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waived.35 There are two reasons for focusing the analysis in this
manner. First, although the Supreme Court has indicated that
an effective waiver of the Miranda and Brewer v. Williams 36 rights
cannot be achieved through police trickery,3 7 the restrictions on
police deception in the post-waiver situation are less than clear.38
Second, the police manuals advise law enforcement officials to obtain
a waiver before employing any of the suggested interrogation
tactics.3 9 The lack of clear constitutional standards and the apparent
police belief that deception is appropriate in this context suggest the
need for a detailed examination of the legitimacy of police trickery
in this area.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON POLICE TRICKERY

A. The Current Status of Miranda
As has already been noted,40 the Miranda requirements are
calculated to insure adequate fifth amendment protection for sus-

pects subjected to custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation

was defined as questioning by police officers "after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in a significant way." 41 The Supreme Court provided that,

at the beginning of such interrogation, in the absence of "other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused per35
That is, the suspect has been given his Miranda warnings or has been informed of his right to an attorney and soon thereafter has made statements or taken
action that under existing law would constitute a valid waiver of his rights. As will
be demonstrated more fully below, the fifth and sixth amendments and the voluntariness requirement provide continuing protection to the suspect, even after an initial
waiver.
36430 U.S. 387 (1977).
37
The Miranda majority stated: "[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
In Brewer v. Williams, the Court explicitly stated that the stringent waiver standard
first formulated in Johnson v. Zerbst applied to waiver of the right to counsel.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See notes 78-80 infra & accompanying text. Accordingly,
the Miranda prohibition on trickery in inducing a waiver would appear to apply with
equal force in the Williams context.
3
sProfessors Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel have pointed to the uncertainty in
this area of the law. Y. KAmmm, W. LAFAVE, & J. IMAM, supra note 28, at 589-90.
39 According to one widely used manual, "all but a very few of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier [pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda]
publication are still valid if used after the recently prescribed warnings have been
given to the suspect under interrogation, and after he has waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel." F. INBAU & J.Rom, supra note 2, at 1,
quoted in Y. X misAf, W. LAFAvE, & J. IsRAEL, supra note 28, at 589.
40
See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
4
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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sons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it," 42 the interrogating officer must advise the
suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him, and that he has a right to have retained
or appointed counsel present at the interrogation. 43 Moreover, the
Court stated that a suspect may waive these rights, "provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 44 As
noted above, 45 the Court emphasized that even after an initial
waiver, the suspect has a continuing opportunity to assert the right
to remain silent or the right to an attorney at any point prior to the
completion of the interrogation.46
4
The Burger Court has limited Miranda in important respects. 7
For present purposes, two limitations are particularly significant.
First, by its decisions in Beckwith v. United States 48 and Oregon v.

Mathiason,49 the Court appears to have restricted its definition of
"custodial interrogation" to situations that involve "coercive environments" similar to those considered by the Court in Miranda itself. 0
Thus, unless a suspect is actually subjected to the coercive pressures
generated by involuntary restraints and interrogation in a police
station-like atmosphere, 1 Miranda seems to be inapplicable.
Second, the Court concluded in Michigan v. Tucker 2 that the
use in a criminal trial of statements obtained in violation of Miranda
Id. 467.
Id. 444.
44Id.
45 See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
46
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
47 For an excellent critical analysis of the post-Miranda cases, see Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99.
42

43

48425 U.S. 341 (1976) (questioning of suspect in private house held not to
require Miranda warnings).
49429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (private questioning of a suspect, who came
to police station "voluntarily" at officer's request, held not to require Miranda

warnings).
50 As Professor Stone has noted, "Mathiason was questioned in a police station
behind closed doors, he was on parole, and he was informed, not just that he was
being investigated, but that the police already believed him to be guilty." Stone,
supra note 47, at 154. Despite the similarity between the coercive pressures confronting Mathiason and those confronting the Miranda defendants, the Supreme
Court summarily concluded that Miranda did not apply because Miranda was concerned with custodial interrogation and "[i]t was that sort of coercive environment

to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited."
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (latter emphasis added).
51In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the Court held that Miranda applied when the defendant was arrested at his home. However, in light of Beckwith
and Mathiason, the current vitality of Orozco is questionable.
52417
U.S. 433 (1974). For an incisive analysis of Tucker, see Stone, supra

note 47, at 115-25.
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does not, in itself, violate the fifth amendment privilege. The
Court perceived the Mirandawarnings as a prophylactic rule devised
to insure that statements are voluntarily madeY3 Under Tucker,
statements obtained in violation of Miranda will generally be inadmissible,"4 but their use by the prosecution will not violate the
fifth amendment unless there is a violation of the traditional voluntariness test.5 5 Tucker, in effect, equates the privilege against
self-incrimination with voluntariness, a test that was not designed
to insure the suspect's awareness of his constitutional rights.5 6 In
short, it can be inferred from this decision that the Court has rejected interpreting Miranda to provide a constitutionally mandated
guarantee that suspects will be afforded the opportunity for intelligent exercise of the right to remain silent at each point in the interrogation. 7 Nevertheless, although the Tucker Court viewed the
Miranda warnings as a prophylactic device, rather than as a constitutionally mandated procedure, the scope of the protection
afforded by the Mirandawarnings was not altered.
In order to comprehend fully the limitations that Miranda
imposes on police interrogation tactics in the post-waiver context,
it is necessary to examine more precisely the requirement that the
suspect be permitted to reassert the right to silence and the right to
counsel. It should first be recalled that the purpose of the warnings is to reduce the possibility of coercion throughout the inter53Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974): "The Court recognized [in

Miranda] that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."
54But see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda may be admissible for the purpose of impeaching
the defendant's credibility).
55 [Respondent's] statements could hardly be termed involuntary as that
term has been defined in the decisions of this Court. . . . [Tihe police
conduct at issue here did not abridge respondents constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standard laid down by this court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974).
66 In determining the issue of a confession's "voluntariness," the Court has indicated that police failure to advise the suspect of his right to remain silent or his
right to counsel will be afforded significant, but not decisive, weight. See, e.g.,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) ("voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the suspect's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary
consent.").
57 For an argument favoring this interpretation of Miranda, see Dix, Mistake,
Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975 WAsr.
U. L.Q. 275, 331-36.
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rogation process. If the Miranda warnings are to serve this necessary prophylactic function effectively, police trickery that distorts
their meaning or vitiates their effect should render a resulting confession inadmissible. No one would argue that a specific verbal
denial of the possibility of reassertion is a permissible interrogation
tactic. However, as will be demonstrated below,58 certain types of
police misconduct achieve the same result without explicit misrepresentation of the law. If the reassertion right is to have any real
content, the police should be required to desist from any trickery
that significantly distorts the meaning and effect of the Miranda
warnings.
B. The Independent Right to an Attorney

The aforementioned narrowing of the situations in which the
Miranda warnings are required definitely enhances the significance
of the interrogated suspect's independent right to an attorney that
was enunciated in Brewer v. Williams.59

In Williams, the Court

found it unnecessary to reach a claim that the pretrial police interrogation of the defendant violated Miranda.60 Rather, the Court
held that the defendant was "deprived of a different constitutional
right-the right to the assistance of counsel." " Reaffirming Massiah
v. United States 2 the Court held that "the right to counsel granted
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 63
As a result of the Williams decision, suspects subjected to police
interrogation may assert violations of either Mirandaor the separate
sixth amendment right. A detailed examination of the interrelationship between the fifth and sixth amendment rights is beyond
the scope of this Article."' Williams, however, leaves unanswered
two questions that are particularly significant in determining the
right to counsel doctrine's applicability to police trickery in inducing confessions. First, when does the right to counsel attach? And
58
See notes 150-88 infra & accompanying text.
S9430 U.S. 387 (1977).
60 Id. 397-98. The Court also found it unnecessary to reach defendant's claim
that his confession was involuntary. Id.

61 Id.
62 377

U.S. 201 (1964).

63 430 U.S. at 398.
64

For an extraordinarily perceptive analysis of this interrelationship, see
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogatiorn'?
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1 (1978).
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second, to what extent does the existence of the right depend upon
the suspect's assertion of it?
Williams establishes that the right to counsel attaches at least
at the formal beginning of the adversary process. Of course, unless
the right attaches at an earlier point, Williams would exert
no influence on the vast amount of police interrogation that
occurs before the suspect is formally arraigned. For that reason,
interpretation of the "at least" language is crucial to an understanding of the constitutional limitations on police trickery. Earlier
5 which
cases, including not only Escobedo v. Illinois,1
arguably
66
has little precedential value, but also United States v. Hoffa,6 7
have apparently operated on the assumption that in this context
the suspect's sixth amendment right comes into effect at the point
of arrest.6 8 More recent cases, such as Brewer v. Williams,69 United
States v. Manduano,7 0 and Kirby v. Illinois,71 may indicate that the
Court is now leaning toward a rule under which the sixth amendment right to counsel will never come into effect prior to the formal
initiation of criminal charges; 72 however, at least with respect to
police interrogation, the question remains open.
In the context of police interrogation, the Hoffa and Escobedo
approach appears to be correct. At the point of formal arrest,
the police are likely to be as committed to prosecution as they will
be when charges are formally brought. Because the police objectives and tactics are likely to be identical at the arrest and post6

5Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo held that the suspect's
sixth amendment right to an attorney comes into effect as soon as he becomes the
"focus" of the police investigation. Id. 490-91.
66
See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(Stewart, J.) ("The Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts
67385 U.S. 293 (1966).
6
8 In Hoffa, the Court appeared to base its conclusion that the surreptitious
governmental interrogation did not violate the suspect's sixth amendment right to
counsel upon the fact that the defendant had not yet been arrested. Id. 310.
69430 U.S. at 398-99 (dictum). In justifying its decision, the Court particularly emphasized that judicial proceedings were initiated against the defendant at
the time of the interrogation. Moreover, the Court's prominent citation of Kirby v.
Illinois may be significant in view of Kirby's holding that in the context of a preindictment show-up defendant's right to counsel did not attach until judicial proceedings had been initiated against him.
70425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Burger, CJ., joined by
White, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.) (finding on the basis of Kirby that a grand
jury target being questioned by the grand jury has no right to the presence of counsel because "Enlo criminal proceedings had been instituted against [him], hence the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not come into play.").
71406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel did not apply to a
pre-indictment show-up).
72 See generally Kamisar, supra note 64, at 83.
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arraignment stages, interrogation following arrest should be viewed
as a part of the adversary process and therefore as the event that
triggers the suspect's sixth amendment rights. Kirby's holding that
the sixth amendment right to counsel at a pretrial confrontation
commences only after the initiation of formal proceedings is distinguishable because, unlike the situation in Kirby, pretrial interrogation may involve the privilege against self-incrimination. Even
when it takes place in a non-custodial setting, pretrial interrogation
has the potential effect of forcing an individual "to be made the
deluded instrument of his own conviction" 73 in violation of the
fifth amendment privilege. Because of this critical interplay between the fifth and sixth amendments, 74 insofar as police interrogation is concerned, the suspect's sixth amendment right to an attorney
should attach at the point of formal arrest.
In considering the extent to which the existence of the suspect's
independent right to counsel depends upon his assertion of it, three
different situations should be analyzed: (1) when, as in Williams,
the suspect has asserted the right and is represented by counsel;
(2) when the right has attached and the suspect has not had the
opportunity to assert or waive it; 75 and (8) when there has been an
76
initial waiver of the right.
On its facts, the holding in Williams extends only to the first
situation-at the time of the interrogation, the defendant was represented by counsel. Significantly, however, the Court attached no
importance to the fact that Williams had already asserted his right
to an attorney. Rather, the Court emphasized that "once adversary
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to
legal representation when the government interrogates him." 77 In
fact, the Court explicitly stated that "the right to counsel does not
732 W. HAwKINs, A TRFATiSE OF PLEAS OF TME CROWN 595 (8th ed. J. Curwood London 1824) (1st ed. London 1716-21), quoted in Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.). Although Frankfurter quoted Hawkins with the avowed purpose of identifying one of the principles
imbedded in due process (or fundamental justice), it is apparent that the privilege
against self-incrimination protects the same interest. It is worth noting that Culombe
antedated Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which held that the fifth amendment applies to the states.
74 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 602-03 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976) (statement of accused held inadmissible when prosecution failed to meet the "heavy
burden" of showing a knowing waiver of the right to counsel although the accused
had not requested an attorney).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Putnam, 557 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1977).
77 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
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depend on a request by the defendant." 78 Thus, the second situation appears to be within the reasoning of Williams.
The third case-when the suspect has specifically declined to
exercise his right to counsel-is undoubtedly the most difficult one.
In Williams, the Court made it clear that a suspect may waive his
right to an attorney, provided that waiver meets the standards of
intentionality and awareness promulgated in Johnson v. Zerbst.7 9
The real question is whether the suspect's initial waiver precludes
him from reasserting the right. In the Miranda context, an initial
waiver does not have this effect. s Although distinctions might be
drawn between the Miranda protections and the independent right
to counsel,"' there is good reason to require that both rights be
capable of reassertion. Whether the suspect changes his mind about
the need for an attorney in order to protect his right against selfincrimination (in which case Miranda rights are applicable) or to
protect, his chances at the forthcoming trial (as in the WilliamsMassiah situations), he should be allowed a continuous opportunity
to assert his right. The right to a fair trial is no less fundamental
than the fifth amendment privilege, and the right to have counsel
present during the interrogation protects both constitutional interests with equal force. As with Miranda rights, the sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-arrest interrogation
82
should be continuously available to the suspect.
C. The Current Definition of an Involuntary Confession
As Justice Harlan noted in his Miranda dissent, the Court has
infused the concept of voluntariness "with a number of different
values." 83 Justice Harlan focused on the three paramount concerns that have shaped the test of admissibility: first, an abhorrence
78 Id. 404.

70 "[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
80 See note 28 supra & accompanying text.
81 Unlike the independent sixth amendment right, the Miranda protections are
needed to shield the suspect from police coercion. Because the coercive influences
of the custodial setting may quickly operate to overcome an individual's will, affording the individual subjected to these influences a continuous opportunity to assert
his rights may be particularly important.
82 With respect to a defendant's right to an attorney at trial, lower court cases
have indicated that an initial waiver of the right will not preclude a subsequent
assertion of it unless the assertion will "disrupt orderly procedure." See Arnold v.

United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 n.1 (9th Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1021 (1970). Accord, Fields v. State, 507 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1974).
83 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of convictions based upon unreliable confessions; 84 second, a feeling that police practices utilized to obtain confessions should not
impose an intolerable degree of pressure upon the will of individual
suspects; 8 third, a belief that such practices should not be contrary to the standards of fairness that are fundamental in our
system of justice.8 6 A quick review of the court's development of
these three strands of voluntariness is helpful for an understanding
7
of the relevance to the problem of police trickery.
Early state court cases tended to focus almost exclusively on the
reliability interest. 8 This emphasis was probably attributable to
the shocking factual settings of the early Supreme Court confession
cases. 89 Writing for a unanimous Court in Ward v. Texas,90 Justice Byrnes poignantly inveighed against the police practices that
left the defendant in that case "willing to make any statement that
the officers wanted him to make." 91 In addition, Justice Brynes
pointed to previous cases in which the Court had invalidated convictions obtained under circumstances that raised severe questions
92
about their reliability.
84

See text accompanying notes 88-95 infra.
See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
86
See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
87The history and development of the "voluntariness" standard have been recounted in greater detail elsewhere. See generally 0. SmEPnENs, TkE Su m
COURT AND CoNFxssioNs OF GuuT (1973); Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 34;
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MIca. L. 1Ev. 59 (1966); Kamisar,
What is an Involuntary Confession? 17 RuTGEms L. BEv. 728 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Involuntary Confessions]; Paulsen, supra note 22; Developments in the
Law-Confessions, 79 HAnv. L. 1REv. 935 (1966).
88 See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 87, at 964-69.
89
In a 1963 article, Professor Kamisar drew the following conclusions about
the role that the reliability interest has played in voluntariness doctrine:
Although what the court is prepared to do cannot adequately be explained in this manner, on their facts, the decided cases can be viewed as
an application of two "reliability" standards: First, taking into account the
personal characteristics of the defendant and his particular powers of resistance, did the police methods create too substantial a danger of falsity?
Second, without regard to the particular defendant, are the interrogation
methods utilized in this case . . . sufficiently likely to cause a significant
number of innocent persons to falsely confess, that the police should not be
permitted to proceed in this manner?
Involuntary Confessions, supra note 87, at 755 (emphasis in original).
90 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
85

91 Id. 555.
Justice Byrnes stated:
This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted
from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and protracted
questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence, or who have
been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel,
92
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In Rogers v. Richmond,93 however, the Court considered the
relationship between reliability and "voluntariness," and sharply distinguished between the two concepts. The Court held that the probable truth of a confession, i.e. its reliability, could not be used to
support a finding of voluntariness. 9 4 Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the majority, emphasized that the voluntariness standard protects
interests other than reliability; in particular, he noted, it forbids
the use of coerced confessions to convict a defendant.9 5 Thus, although the test is not framed in terms of reliability, it provides some
assurance that a confession admitted into evidence is the product
of the suspect's perception of the event and not the result of police
coercion.
The second strand of the voluntariness test conditions admissibility on a finding that the confession was a product of the sus-

pect's free and rational choice.9 6 Because of the case-by-case nature
of the inquiry, it is impossible to do more than delineate the various
factors that the Court has weighed in determining whether a particular confession was the product of impermissible coercion. 97 As
Justice Goldberg recognized in Haynes v. Washington,9 8 the test
requires that the Court assess the effect of police practices upon the
"mind and will of an accused," 99and determine the point at which
the pressures created are so great that the accused's will may be
properly considered to be "overborne." i90 As will be discussed
below, 191 the unpredictability of the voluntariness test greatly limits
or who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning.
Id. (citing Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544

(1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629
(1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.

278 (1936); Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924)).
93 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
94 Id. 543-45.
95 Id. 540-41.
96 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality
See
.opinion) (Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944).

generally Developments in the Law, supra note 87, at 973-84.
97
See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 87, at 973-83.
98373 U.S. 503 (1963).
99

Id. 515.

1OO See,

e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)

("We have said

that the question in each case is whether the defendant's will was overborne
"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) ("We conclude that
...
petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely
). See generally Developments in the
aroused after considering all the facts ....

Law, supra note 87, at 973.
10 , See text accompanying notes 107-14 infra.
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its usefulness as a legal standard for the control of police trickery in
interrogation.
A third important component of the "involuntariness" test
relates to the Court's assessment of the fairness or legitimacy of the
police tactics employed.10 2 In view of the applicable line of authority,0 3 a determination of voluntariness may not be based merely
on a judgment that the suspect retained some minimal capacity to
resist police efforts to induce a confession. Rather, as Justice Harlan's Mirandadissent noted, the police must be barred from exerting
"a degree of pressure [on] an individual which unfairly impairs his
capacity to make a rational choice." 104
D. The Need for Per se Rules
In fashioning a constitutional doctrine concerning the admissibility of suspects' confessions, a court must inevitably do more
than merely decide the extent to which police trickery may be tolerated in a free society. In addition, a court must structure the
resulting legal rules in a manner that recognizes the institutional
realities of the criminal justice system. In particular, a court must
take into account the infinite variety of suspects' personality patterns and police interrogation practices. On one level, because
criminal suspects do not possess uniform personality characteristics,
a court must decide the extent to which the appropriate tests will be
tailored to accommodate the individual responses to police pressure
by particular criminal suspects. In other words, should a court
apply a subjective or objective test, or something in between? A
distinct but closely related problem concerns the extent to which
a court should prohibit particular interrogation techniques through
the promulgation of per se rules (i.e., prohibiting a certain tactic
or category of tactics). As will be demonstrated below, the extent
to which a per se approach is adopted will have important consequences on police behavior and judicial review.
The pertinent question in the objective-subjective controversy
can be rephrased: Should the courts focus primarily upon the police
conduct itself and attempt to measure its likely effect upon a typical
person who is in the suspect's position or should the courts focus
exclusively on the actual impact of the police conduct upon the
See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
10 3 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), and cases cited in note 21
supra.
(Harlan, J., dissenting)
104 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 n.4 (1966)
(quoting Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 34, at 73).
102
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particularsuspect who is before the court? An objective approach
clearly generates more meaningful guidance for the police and lower
courts than its subjective counterpart. Under the latter approach,
when the legitimacy of an interrogation tactic varies with the
strengths and weaknesses of a particular suspect, an interrogating
officer cannot predict the judicial response to the use of a given
tactic with any degree of precision. When the dimensions of constitutional standards are so ill-defined, the danger must increase that
the police will conduct their interrogations without regard for the
constitutional rights of the suspect. Similarly, the subjective approach provides little guidance to the courts. If the question in
every case is the effect on a particular suspect, precedent is likely
to be of little importance. To the extent possible, therefore, both
from the perspectives of law enforcement and judicial administration, courts should develop legal rules that limit interrogation tactics
by objective standards.
In fact, although Supreme Court opinions often purport to
engage in a subjective inquiry, Professor Kamisar's 1963 study demonstrates that "much more often than not, if not always, when the
Court considers the peculiar, individual characteristics of the person confessing, it is only applying a rule of inadmissibility. 'Strong'
personal characteristics rarely, if ever, 'cure' forbidden police
methods; but 'weak' ones may invalidate what are generally permissible methods." 105 Determination of whether the standard
was met was based in part upon the Court's evaluation of the effect
that the police tactics employed would have upon a typical person
in the position of the suspect subjected to the interrogation and in
part upon its assessment of the fairness of the tactics employed. 10 6
The second question-the extent to which the courts should
prohibit particular interrogation tactics through per se rules as
opposed to engaging in a consideration of the totality of the circumstances-has not been resolved in a way that provides satisfactory
guidance for courts and law enforcement officials. In assessing the
legality of police interrogation tactics, the pre-Escobedo cases generally did not rely on per se rules. Recognizing that the impact of
police practices upon an individual may not be considered in a
vacuum, the Court considered the impact of the pressures generated
by police tactics in light of their probable cumulative effect. 07 In
105 Involuntary Confessions, supra note 87, at 758 (emphasis in original).
106
See generally id.
107See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321, 323 (1959).
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a few extraordinary situations, the Court indicated that utilization
of a particular police practice would be sufficient in itself to render
a resulting confession involuntary. 08 However, for the most part,
the Court insisted upon determining voluntariness through a meticulous examination of the "totality of circumstances." 109
By the early sixties, however, experience had demonstrated that
the "totality of circumstances" test was an ineffective means of
preventing unacceptable police pressures. The inadequacy of the
test is partially attributable to the imperfection of the applicable
factfinding procedure.'" As Professor Kamisar has recently demonstrated, in most cases the traditional litigation process is simply
inadequate to determine either the extent or the quality of police
pressure applied to individual criminal suspects."' Beyond that,
however, the "totality of circumstances" test's fatal flaw is its failure
to generate precedents that can serve as guidelines for the police
and the lower courts.
The failure to formulate rules that apply beyond limited factual settings has had important consequences. Police are most
likely to view as legitimate effective interrogation tactics that have
not been expressly prohibited." 2 Moreover, in analyzing the
myriad circumstances surrounding an interrogation, trial judges
unfortunately are tempted to defer to the judgment of the police."8
108 In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944), the Court held that 36
hours of continuous interrogation was "inherently coercive." The strong implication
was that when questioning of that duration occurs, the effect of other factors need
not be considered. Moreover, even the Ashcraft dissent recognized that "violence
per se is, an outlaw," 322 U.S. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting), thus implying that
any statement induced by violence or threat of violence would be automatically inadmissible. Accord, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); Ward v. Texas,
316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
09
'
See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 87, at 973-84.
110 See generally Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 806-09 (1970).
"'I See Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting
Record, 66 Gzo. L.J. 209, 234-35 (1977).
112 Despite the Miranda opinion's evident distaste for a number of the tactics
contained in the Inbau and Reid manual, see 384 U.S. at 449-55, the revised edition
(published one year after Miranda) advised the police to continue employing the
same tactics. See F. INBA & J. REI, supra note 2,at 1. Obviously, the authors
reasoned that tactics not specifically prohibited could continue to be employed. This
perhaps illustrates the validity of Justice Jackson's observation, made in the fourth
amendment context, to the effect that "officers interpret and apply themselves and
will push to the limit" constitutional doctrines expounded by the Supreme Court.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J.,dissenting).
113 One of the most striking recent examples of this appears in State v. Reilly,
No. 5285 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 12, 1974), vacated, 32 Conn. Supp. 349, 355
A.2d 324 (Super. Ct. 1976). See text accompanying notes 175 & 176 infra. In
addition to employing the psychological techniques described below, the police held
the immature 18 year old suspect incommunicado, allowed him at most a few hours
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Finally, appellate courts may quite legitimately defer to lower court
findings of "voluntariness," particularly because they are at least
partially factual and, due to the innumerable circumstances that
generally are involved, it is unlikely that any given case will be
controlled by a prior Supreme Court decision. 1 4 The net result
is that in many cases the courts effectively defer to the police and
make their judgment of the legitimacy of interrogation tactics the
decisive one.
Per se rules, prohibiting certain categories of police tactics, obviously provide better guidance for the police and increased protection for suspects. Accordingly, the framing of the constitutionally mandated rules limiting police trickery should be undertaken
with awareness of these realities. The inquiry envisioned by this
Article requires that a court take an additional conceptual step
after determining that a given interrogation tactic vitiates the
Miranda or Williams guarantees or results in a coerced confession:
whenever possible, the court should identify the objectionable
characteristic that emerges from its scrutiny of the facts surrounding an invalid interrogation. If that infirmity creates an unacceptable risk of infringing the typical suspect's constitutional rights,
the court should hold that such police conduct is illegal per se. Although the objectionable police conduct may conceivably occur in
myriad forms and in various settings, a per se rule would require that
police officers design their interrogation techniques to avoid the
proscribed conduct in all situations. Although it is impossible to
develop prospectively a complete catalogue of prohibited tactics,
this Article will utilize the suggested objective approach and conceptual framework to identify several police tactics that create an
unacceptable risk of infringing the typical suspect's constitutional
rights. Before beginning this task, however, it is necessary to define
the standard of probability implicit in the phrase "unacceptable
risk" and to specify the degree of subjectivity envisaged in this approach.
The per se rules should prohibit police conduct that is likely
to render a resulting confession involuntary or to undermine the
sleep and no hot food, and interrogated him for virtually 26 continuous hours in
order to obtain his confession. Based on a plethora of Supreme Court cases, the
confession would appear to be clearly inadmissible. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944), discussed at note 108, supra. Nevertheless, the lower court
admitted it.
114 For an illustration of the highly deferential attitude that may plausibly be
adopted by an appellate court, see Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2422-23
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156-58, 170-73 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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effect of required Mirandawarnings or a suspect's independent right
to an attorney. Although law enforcement interests rule out a lesser
burden of proof (e.g., "possibly render"), the fundamental nature
of the suspect's constitutional rights mandates a sensible allocation
of the risk of error. This standard of probability (i.e., likely to
render) is preferable to requiring a demonstration that the conduct
in question invariably or nearly always results in violations. Police
should not engage in conduct that is likely to induce a coerced confession or negate constitutional protections (even though it may not
invariably do so) because obviously a high risk exists that significant
harm (in terms of unlawfully obtained confessions or improper
coercion) will ensue. Therefore, prophylactic rules designed to
deter the police from engaging in conduct with such a probable
effect are appropriate.
In formulating per se rules of this type, a court should not
consider police conduct in a vacuum. The likelihood that particular conduct will coerce confessions or undermine fifth or sixth
amendment protections depends not only upon the content of the
conduct but also upon its probable effect upon a specific suspect.
Particularly in the case of psychologically oriented interrogation
techniques, conduct that might be totally innocuous when employed,
in an ordinary interrogation situation may, under certain special
circumstances, be likely to have a devastating psychological impact
on a suspect. Therefore, the per se rules should be formulated not
in terms of prohibiting specific police conduct as such, but as
prohibiting police conduct that is likely to produce certain types
of effects upon suspects.' 15
For example, if it is determined that the tactic of challenging
a suspect's dignity should be prohibited,"1 6 in deciding whether this
per se rule applies a court will have to consider whether a person in,
the suspect's position (given the individual characteristics of the
suspect known to the police) 11 would feel that the police con115 It should be emphasized, however, that the Court's assessment of the officer's
intent or good faith should not affect the application of a per se rule. If it is determined that the officer's conduct was in fact likely to have the proscribed effect upon

the suspect, the absence of conscious wrongdoing on the officer's part should be

constitutionally irrelevant.
116 See notes 245-48 infra & accompanying text.
1 7
1 This factor must be taken into account because the guidelines are ultimately
designed to regulate police conduct. If the police engage in conduct that from their
perspective would appear innocuous, but in fact is likely to have a devastating effect
on the suspect, the conduct should not become the subject of a per se rule. However, when innocent conduct induces a confession that is "involuntary" under tradi-

tional doctrine, the confession must of course be excluded. See Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1963)

(benign purpose of interrogating officer does not
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duct was a challenge to his dignity.118 If it is found that the police
tactic induces such a feeling, operation of the per se rule will
render any resulting confession automatically inadmissible. However, if the court finds that, when viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the position of the interrogating officer, the
tactic does not constitute a challenge to the suspect's dignity, the
per se rule will be inapplicable. Thus, the per se rules will of
necessity be phrased in terms of conduct and its likely effect, the
latter of which introduces a limited degree of subjectivity into the
test.
Obviously, the development and application of per se rules
will involve the court in difficult judgments. In determining
whether police conduct will be likely to have a particular impact
on the typical suspect, the court may have to perform the difficult
task of placing itself in the shoes of the suspect as viewed by the
interrogating officer. However, given the complexity of the interests at stake, any principled approach in this area inevitably will
involve difficult judgments. When compared to the more subjective
version of the "totality of circumstances" test, the proposed approach will provide increased clarity in that the police and courts
will at least be informed of specific danger zones; that is, they will
have notice that tactics that have certain predictable effects are
forbidden. The proposed approach has the virtue of allowing the
courts to take account of the complex interrelationship between
police conduct and its effect on individual suspects while at the
same time enabling them to decide cases in a way that will provide
concrete guidance for the future.
III.

EVALUATION OF CERTAIN POLICE INTERROGATION TACTICs

This section of the Article will describe certain categories of
interrogation tactics that can validly be subjected to per se prohibitions. No attempt will be made to discuss every widely employed
tactic or to develop a general theory that would be applicable to
every technique. In order to achieve organizational clarity, the
validate a confession that is in fact involuntary). A confession should also be held
invalid, although not on a per se basis, if it is obtained by innocent police conduct
that impermissibly vitiates the effect of Miranda warnings or the independent right
to counsel. Such a result could be obtained under the traditional methodology.
11s For example, in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the interrogating
detective's "Christian burial" speech and his use of the word "Reverend" in addressing the suspect would be likely to challenge the dignity of a deeply religious person,
but would have little effect on the dignity of an ordinary person. Because the
detective was aware of the suspect's deep religious convictions, 430 U.S. at 392, the
speech could properly be characterized as a challenge to the suspect's dignity.
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section will begin by discussing tactics that create problems primarily because of their potential negation of the Miranda protections (or the independent right to counsel) and continue with a discussion of those that should be prohibited because of their coercive
effects.
A. Deception About Whether an InterrogationIs Taking Place
A form of deception that totally undermines the fifth or sixth
amendment protections available to an individual occurs when the
police deceive a suspect about whether an interrogation is taking
place." 9 A classic example of this type of deception occurred
in Massiah v. United States.120 In Massiah, the defendant and
his confederate Colson were arrested and indicted for possession
of narcotics aboard a United States vessel. After both were released
on bail, Colson, without defendant's knowledge, agreed to cooperate
with the government in their efforts to obtain further information
relating to the offense. 121 Equipped with a transmitter that broadcasted conversations held in his automobile to another government
agent, Colson engaged in a lengthy conversation with defendant;
at defendant's trial, incriminating statements made by him during
the course of this conversation were introduced into evidence. The
Court held the statements inadmissible on the ground that they
were obtained in violation of the protections afforded the defendant
22
by his sixth amendment right to counsel.1

Of course, the deception utilized in Massiah did not deprive
the defendant of his right to an attorney in any ordinary sense. As
19 Actually, in light of the post-Miranda narrowing of Miranda's applicability,
see notes 47-57 supra & accompanying text, it is likely that the suspect has no

fifth amendment protection when this form of deception occurs. Because the
suspect is unaware that interrogation is taking place, it is likely that the "custodial
interrogation" element of Miranda would not be met. See text accompanying notes
47-57 supra.

Therefore, the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches

assumes critical importance. This Article has argued that the sixth amendment right
should be triggered at the point of formal arrest. See notes 64-74 supra &
accompanying text.

However, if the right does not come into effect until after a

suspect is formally charged, the police may use undercover agents or private citizens
to obtain statements from suspects who are in police custody and who have asserted
their Miranda rights but have not yet been formally charged. For lower court cases
dealing with this issue, see, for example, Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405,
247 A.2d 612 (1968) (statements inadmissible when police engaged defendant's
parents to elicit incriminating statements from him while he was in the hospital);

State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976)

(statements inadmissible when

police placed undercover policeman in defendant's cell shortly after his arrest and

defendant had already refused to talk to police before seeing an attorney).
120377

121
122

U.S. 201 (1964).

Id. 202.
Id. 205-06.
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Professors Enker and Elsen have pointed out, "so far as the record
in Massiah reveals, [the defendant] may very well have consulted
with his counsel before talking to Colson." 123 Indeed, nothing indicates that the government did anything to prevent him from having his attorney present when he met with Colson in the car.124
What the government did was not to deprive the defendant of his
right to counsel, but rather to render that right useless by not disclosing that the conversation with Colson was, in effect, a part of
an adversary process in which an attorney's presence was necessary.
Thus, as the Court implicitly recognized, the key to the violation
in Massiah was the fact that, due to the governmental deception,
at the time the defendant made his incriminating statements to
Colson he "did not even know that he was under interrogation by a
government agent." 125 Due to this deception, the sixth amendment
protection that should have been available to defendant was effectively defeated. A practice that makes the suspect unaware that the
police are interrogating him, and therefore is likely to remove from
his consideration the question whether he should have counsel present, clearly creates an unacceptable risk of infringement of the
suspect's constitutional rights. This interrogation technique, therefore, should be the subject of a per se prohibition.
The per se prohibition against deception that defeats the suspect's sixth amendment right by deceiving him about whether an
interrogation is taking place should not be limited to post-indictment interrogation (which is the extent of the holding of Massiah),
but should also be extended to similar conduct that occurs after formal arrest. 12 This stratagem is as likely to be effective in the period
between arrest and indictment as it is afterward. Further, the per
se proscription should apply whether or not the suspect has initially
waived his right to an attorney. As was noted previously, 127 the
government must afford the suspect a continuous opportunity to
assert his right to an attorney throughout the interrogation process.
Deception about whether an interrogation is taking place, however,
negates this opportunity. When a suspect is deceived about whether
the government is seeking to elicit incriminating evidence from
123 Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Mmmi. L. REv. 47, 56 n.32 (1964).
124 Id.

125 377 U.S. at 206.
12 6 This Article has argued that the sixth amendment right should be triggered
at the point of formal arrest. See notes 64-74 supra & accompanying text.
12 7 See notes 79-81 supra & accompanying text.
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him,128 he obviously has little basis upon which to assess or reassess
the question whether he needs the assistance of counsel during this
phase of the adversary process. Therefore, even if the suspect has
initially waived his right to an attorney, police deception about
whether an interrogation is currently taking place should also be
impermissible per se.
Even if the Court holds that the suspect's right to an attorney
is not triggered at the point of arrest, 129 admissions obtained as a
result of post-arrest deception about whether an interrogation is
taking place should be held inadmissible on the ground that the use
of this tactic is inherently unfair. Close examination of the relative
strengths of the suspect and the police in this context demonstrates
the desirability of extending the fairness strand of voluntariness doctrine to prohibit this practice.

30

In order to understand the suspect's perspective, it must be
noted that he is invariably confined in some manner when this deception is perpetrated. 31' Professor Dix has pointed out that surreptitious attempts to elicit incriminating disclosures place considerable pressure to confess upon any confined suspect. As Dix states,
"Mere confinement might increase a suspect's anxiety, and he is
128 This would appear to be the appropriate definition of interrogation in the
Massiah-Williams context, as opposed to the definition of custodial interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda. One recent circuit court case has held that in view
of Williams' language relating to the meaning of interrogation, Massiah's proscription
only applies when the undercover agent engages in direct questions or inquiries
and not when he engages the defendant in conversation with a purpose to elicit
incriminating responses. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978),
petitions for rehearingand rehearing en bane denied, 590 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979).
As Professor Kamisar's recent article demonstrates, this is an improper interpretation
of Williams. Kamisar, supra note 64, at 5-44 & passim. Accord, Henry v. United
States, No. 77-2338 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1978).
129 Professor Kamisar has predicted that Williams will not be extended to
interrogation that occurs before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings. See
Kamisar, supra note 64, at 83.
130 For a brief discussion of this aspect of voluntariness doctrine, see notes 19-22
supra & accompanying text.
131 Under ordinary circumstances, before an arrested suspect can be released,
the charges against him must be dropped or he must be brought before a judicial
officer for the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. If the charges are
dropped, and the suspect is released, the sixth amendment right to counsel probably
does not apply to subsequent police interrogation. Although this Article has argued
that the right should attach at the point of arrest, it is likely that the dropping of the
charge would negate the effect of the prior arrest for purposes of applying Williams.
Even though the police may continue to focus upon the suspect as a target of their
investigation the Court has held that the police are not required to arrest a suspect,
and thereby possibly trigger the suspect's sixth amendment rights, even though they
have sufficient evidence to take that step. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
310 (1966). Accordingly, in cases in which the suspect is not confined, he would
not be protected by the sixth amendment, even though deception about whether he
is being interrogated may in fact occur.
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likely to seek discourse with others to relieve this anxiety. That
search, of course, may make him more susceptible to an undercover
investigator seeking information about the offense for which the
suspect has been arrested." 132 Confinement of the suspect increases
the power of the police in an important respect. Because the
suspect's ability to select people with whom he can confide is completely within their control, 13 3 the police have a unique opportunity
to exploit the suspect's vulnerability. In short, the police can insure that if the pressures of confinement lead the suspect to confide
in anyone, it will be a police agent. In view of the government's
control over the suspect's channels of communication, it is blatantly
unfair to allow the government to exploit the suspect's vulnerability
by trickery of this type.
Indeed, in one respect the deception in the "jail plant" situa134
tion is more invidious than that involved in Spano v. New York,

the seminal case dealing with the fairness strand of voluntariness
doctrine. 135 In Spano, the defendant adamantly resisted police efforts to obtain a statement until he was confronted by Bruno, a
fledgling officer who was also defendant's childhood friend, and who
by telephone had persuaded Spano to surrender to the police. Pursuant to instruction from his superiors, Bruno falsely told the defendant that his "telephone call had gotten him [Bruno] into trouble,
that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child." 136
After assuming this role four times within the period of an hour,
Bruno's deception successfully elicited a confession.
Although the Court held that the confession was involuntary
based on the totality of the circumstances, 13 7 the majority opinion's
132 Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEXAs L. REv.
203, 230 (1975). Professor Dix suggests that a Miranda-type barrier should preclude use of the "jail plant" tactic. Id. Professor Kamisar has argued cogently to
the contrary. See Kamisar, supra note 64, at 61-69.
133 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616,
616 (1968), noted this aspect of confinement. In Miller, an undercover police
agent testified at defendant's trial about conversations they had engaged in while
they shared a cell prior to the defendant's arraignment. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice
Marshall, and the three Justices who joined in his opinion, would have extended
Massiah to exclude the agent's testimony. Justice Marshall argued that "[i]ndeed, in
one respect at least, this is a clearer case than Massiah: unlike the defendant there,
who had been released on bail, petitioner was in custody without bail, with a
consequent lack of freedom to choose her companions." Id. 624.
134 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
135 See notes 19-22 supra & accompanying text.
L36 360 U.S. at 323.
3.7 Id. 321.
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marked distaste for Bruno's conduct indicated that the use of such
a stratagem might in itself invalidate the resulting confession. To
be sure, the deception employed in Spano can be distinguished
from that of the typical "jail plant" situation. First, it is significant
that Bruno was a long-time friend of the defendant, as opposed to a
previously unknown cellmate. Second, in contrast to the typical
"jail plant" situation, the defendant in Spano was explicitly and
persistently urged to confess in order to avert dire consequences
for his friend. 138 The presence of these additionally coercive elements in Spano undoubtedly intensified the pressure placed upon
the defendant to make an incriminating statement.
However, the broader "illegal methods" 139 language in Spano
suggests that the Court was concerned more with deception than
coercion. When the potential for deception is the focus of comparison, the conventional "jail plant" ploy emerges as the more objectionable interrogation tactic. In Spano, the defendant at least knew
that his "friend" was a police officer and that his goal was to obtain
a confession. By contrast, the suspect exposed to the "jail plant"
is deceived completely about his cellmate's identity and purpose.
The dception perpetrated in Spano unfairly weakened the suspect's
ability to resist the police efforts to obtain a confession; the trickery
of the "jail plant" ploy affords the suspect no opportunity to apply
his powers of resistance because the peril of speaking is hidden from
him. Accordingly, the "fairness" aspect of Spano should be expanded to prohibit this practice.
Once a general category of trickery has been deemed prohibited per se, a similar technique (especially one arguably within
the same category) can be analyzed by comparing it to the tactic
already proscribed. To be successful, such a comparison will involve the difficult definitional problems inherent in framing or
applying legal rules. In the context of this type of deception, the
analysis may be expected to involve distinguishing between impermissible deception about whether an interrogation is taking place
and a permissible failure to disclose relevant information. Many
of the tactics utilized in the course of an ordinary interrogation
may have the effect of making a suspect forget that the police are
seeking to elicit incriminating evidence. 140 Presumably, however,
138 The coercive nature of this tactic can be explained by the fact that it takes
on the character of a threat. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the use of
threats and promises during interrogation, see notes 189-217 infra & accompanying

text.

U.S. at 320-21.
140 For example, it is said that in order to establish a rapport that will encourage
the disclosure of incriminating information, it is desirable to "[elstablish confidence
139360
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when a suspect has been informed of the police officer's intention
to interrogate him and has consented, the police will not be required
to preface every attempt to elicit incriminating statements 141 with a
reminder to the suspect that they are continuing to interrogate him.
On the other hand, the government obviously should not be permitted to argue that no deception occurred in Massiah because the
defendant never happened to ask Colson whether he was acting as an
undercover agent for the government. In between these two extremes, this analysis will involve close comparisons: the adoption
of a per se rule will not eliminate the necessity of difficult linedrawing.
People v. Ketchel,1' - which involved an interrogation tactic
analogous to deception about whether interrogation is taking place,
provides an opportunity to demonstrate the suggested approach.
In Ketchel, three defendants were arrested for robbery and murder.
After talking with them for twenty minutes about the crimes, the
police left the three suspects together in a room, after telling them
that they were " 'free' to talk." 143 The room had in fact been
wired to record the conversation. During the conversation, two of
the defendants expressed the possibility that the room might be
bugged.144 Nevertheless, all three of them proceeded to make incriminating statements. In holding that these statements were
properly admissible at the defendants' trials, the court applied the
traditional voluntariness test' 45 and found that "[t]he prior police
statements as to the free use of the room could not have been such
'as to overbear [defendants'] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined' . . . because [defendants] them-

selves suspected their conversations were overheard." 146 Thus, the
court implied that police trickery with respect to whether an interrogation is taking place will not be impermissible so long as the
and friendliness by talking for a period about everyday subjects. In other words,
'have a friendly visit."' See F. RoYAL & S. ScH=ur, supra note 2, at 61-62. Obviously, the purpose of the "friendly visit" is to distract the suspect from the reality
that an interrogation is taking place. See generally Kamisar, supra note 111.
141 The Court apparently adopted this definition of "interrogation" in Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1977). See note 128 supra.
rev'd en
14259 Cal. 2d 503, 381 P.2d 394, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963),
bane, 63 Cal. 2d 859, 409 P.2d 694, 48 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1966). After retrial on the
penalty issue, the Supreme Court of California voided the confessions on the authority
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). People v. Ketchel, 63 Cal. 2d 859,
868, 409 P.2d 694, 699, 48 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1966).
14359

Cal. 2d at 521, 381 P.2d at 402, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 546.

144 Id., 381 P.2d at 403, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
145The case was originally decided before Massiah or Miranda.
146 59 Cal. 2d at 521, 381 P.2d at 403, 30 Cal Rptr. at 547 (emphasis in
original).
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suspect subjected to such trickery is aware of the possibility that
such trickery is being employed.
This approach is misdirected and should not be incorporated
into an analysis of a suspect's sixth amendment rights. As noted
above, a subjective approach that focuses on the effect of police
practices on a particular defendant does not provide effective guidance to the police and courts. 4 7 Moreover, even if a totally objective approach is not adopted, as long as a defendant is actually
deceived, it should not matter whether he was totally deceived, or
partially deceived in that he recognized the possibility of deception.
After all, anyone who considers the matter will know that there is
always some possibility of governmental deception. A suspect's
constitutional rights should not turn upon the degree of cynicism he
expresses. 48
If it has first been established that deception about whether
an interrogation is taking place is impermissible per se, 149 under
the suggested approach the question in a case like Ketchel should be
whether the failure to disclose the fact that the room was bugged
can be equated with that deception. In light of Massiah, impermissible deception can obviously take place without any overt
misstatement. Deception in this context would appear to occur
whenever the government fails to disclose to the suspect that it has
changed the situation to make it contrary to an ordinary person's
reasonable expectations about interrogation. An ordinary person
in Massiah's position would not reasonably expect that his friend
was acting as a government agent; similarly, an ordinary person
occupying the position of the defendants in Ketchel would not
reasonably expect that the room in which they were conversing was
bugged. Because governmental deception of this nature is likely to
lead an arrested suspect to believe that no interrogation is taking
place, incriminating statements obtained by failing to disclose that
the room was bugged should likewise be inadmissible per se.
B. Deception That Distorts the Meaning of the
Miranda Warnings
When the Miranda protections are applicable, deception that
defeats them definitely occurs when police trickery leads the suspect
to believe that the Mirandawarnings are totally inapplicable. For
147 See notes 99-106 supra & accompanying text.
148 Cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MNr. L. EBv.
349, 384 (1974) ("[N]either Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect

of government. They tell us what we should demand of government.").
349 See text accompanying notes 119-27 supra.

1979]

POLICE TRICKERY IN INDUCING CONFESSIONS

example, if in the course of an interrogation following a valid
waiver, the suspect is questioned by a new officer who tells him that
he no longer has a right to remain silent or that statements he makes
cannot be used against him, statements made by the suspect in response would clearly be inadmissible. 150
If Miranda is more than an empty formality, statements or
tricks that significantly distort the meaning of the warnings should
similarly be barred. For example, if a suspect who has initially
waived his rights is told that statements he makes to the officers
will actually benefit him in a reduction of the charge, 151 this advice
appears to conflict with the meaning of the first two Miranda
warnings. The suspect might naturally infer that although he may
have some technical right to remain silent, the right is not a meaningful one in that in reality it is in his best interest to talk. At
the same time, he may feel that although his statement can be used
against him, that is not nearly as important as the fact that it can
be used in his favor. Direct distortion of this magnitude obviously
vitiates the effect of the Miranda warnings, 152 thus resulting in a
violation of the principle that requires that the warnings remain
in effect (or at least not be negated by police conduct) throughout
the interrogation.
At least some degree of distortion of the Miranda warnings
occurs whenever the police make a misstatement that relates to the
legal effect of the suspect's exercise of his right to remain silent.
For example, if after warning the suspect of his rights and obtaining
a valid waiver, the police tell the suspect that one of his confederates
is going to make an accusatory statement in his presence, and this
1o0 Cf. Commonwealth v. Dunstin, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2302, 368 N.E.2d 1388
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978) (incriminating statements held inadmissible when guard told defendant that only statements made under oath at trial
could be used against him); Commonwealth v. Hale, 467 Pa. 293, 356 A.2d 756
(1976) (results of tests by police psychiatrist held inadmissible when psychiatrist
told accused before testing that the test results would be used only at sentencing).
1 Cf. Fillinger v. State, 349 So. 2d 714 (Fla. App. 1977) (confession held
involuntary because defendant was told that if she cooperated, the state attorney
would be so informed before establishing the amount of the bond upon which she
was to be held); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963) (confession
held inadmissible when given after suspect was told that his confession might lead
to a juvenile court trial instead of one in criminal court). The contents of the tape
recording made of the six-hour Biron interrogation are discussed below. See text
accompanying notes 199-201 & 217 infra.
152 Cf. Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 189-90, 266 A.2d 753,
754-55 (1970) (holding that delivering the second Miranda warning by telling
suspect that "any statement he gave could be used 'for, or against him' at trial" is
impermissible because it "vitiates the intended impact of the warning" (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
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statement can be used against him unless he denies it, 153 this incorrect statement of law 15-adds an important caveat to the Miranda
In effect, the suspect is told, "You have a right to rewarnings.
main silent, but in the context of your particular situation, exercise
of that right will produce damaging evidence that will be used
against you." This addition to the Miranda warnings so distorts
their meaning that it significantly undermines their effect. A substantial likelihood exists that, during the remainder of the interrogation, the suspect, confronted with this information, will base his
decision whether or not to assert his constitutional right to remain
silent upon the mistaken premise that his silence can be used against
him. The interrogator's distortion of the Mirandawarnings creates
an unacceptable risk that the ordinary suspect will be deprived of
the protection afforded by the warnings. Therefore, statements obtained as a result of these types of misstatements should be inadmissible per se.
Of course, the police may indirectly achieve distortion of the
Miranda warnings' meaning without making any misstatements of
the law. This may occur when the police verbally impress upon
the suspect that it is really in his own best interest for him to talk
and tell the truth. For example, the Inbau-Reid manual recommends that the interrogator should inform "the suspect that even
if he were your own brother (or father, sister, etc.), you would still
advise him to speak the truth." 155
The validity of practices that indirectly distort the Miranda
warnings may be tested by comparing their likely effect to the results of direct distortion of the Miranda warnings, already the subject of a per se proscription under the suggested analysis. Statements
of this type undercut the effect of Miranda warnings just as effectively as direct distortions of the warnings' legal scope. After all,
the typical criminal suspect is not interested in abstract propositions
of law; he wants to know what the score is. He may well believe
that because the police are the ones who gave him the Miranda
warnings, they can be expected to know the warnings' value. If
the police advise him that it is really in his best interest to make a
153 Cf. State v. Braun, 82 Wash. 2d 157, 509 P.2d 742 (1973) (police told
accused that codefendant's confession would be admissible against him if repeated
in his presence).

Of course, the police may convey the same message to the suspect

tacitly without misinforming him of the effect of his failure to deny.

Cf. text

accompanying note 155 infra.
154 The Court has made it clear that once the Miranda warnings have been
given, the defendant's silence may not be used against him under any circumstances.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
155 F. INBAu & J. REr, supra note 2, at 60.
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full disclosure, the suspect is likely to believe them, and, as a result,
the effect of the Miranda warnings will be essentially negated. Although the inherent limitations of a system that initially entrusts
the protection of the suspect's constitutional rights to the police
must be acknowledged, a minimal circumscription of the police's
adversarial role is necessary if Miranda is to have any content. If
we are to attribute constitutional significance to verbal warnings by
the police, it is only logical that we attach equal weight to police
statements that predictably vitiate the warnings' desired effect.
Thus, consistent with the policy against directly undermining the
effect of the Mirandawarnings, their indirect distortion, such as by
advice to the suspect that it is in his own best interest to make a full
disclosure, should also be prohibited per se.
C. Deception That Distorts the Seriousness of the
Matter Under Investigation
A slightly different form of trickery occurs when, after having
given the suspect his Miranda warnings, the police misrepresent
the seriousness of the offense. A typical example of this occurs
when an interrogating officer falsely informs a murder suspect that
the victim is still alive. 156 In analyzing whether this type of trickery
impermissibly undermines the effect of the Miranda warnings, it is
first necessary to determine whether the suspect must be informed
of the nature of the charges about which he is being questioned
before he may validly waive his Miranda rights.
Lower courts generally have held that the interrogating officer
need not inform the suspect of the specific nature of the charges
involved in order to obtain a valid waiver. 157 The Supreme Court's
present view on this issue, however, is not dear. In the landmark
case of Johnson v. Zerbst 5 8 the Court equated waiver of a constitutional right with "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege." 159 In cases involving the waiver of
156 See, e.g., People v. Groleau, 44 Ill. App. 3d 807, 358 N.E.2d 1192 (1976);
State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1974). See also Y. KAmisAr, W. LAFAvE,
& J. IsRAEr, supra note 28, at 571.
157 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1212 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877
(1974); United States v. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Prude,
66 II. 2d 470, 363 N.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); People v.
Pereira, 26 N.Y.2d 265, 258 N.E.2d 194, 309 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1970). Contra, Schenk
v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mont. 1968). Cf. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475
Pa. 17, 379 A.2d 553 (1977) (suspect must be informed of the "transaction' that
gave rise to his detention and interrogation).
158304 U.S. 458 (1938).
159 Id. 464.
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trial counsel or of the right to trial, this standard has been held
to mean that there can be no valid waiver unless the defendant has
fairly full information relating to the consequences of the waiver.1 01
Thus, when waiver of these rights is at issue, precise information
relating to the nature of the charges against the defendant is clearly
required.161
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,16 2 a recent case involving waiver
of fourth amendment rights, the Court noted in passing that when
the suspect's fifth amendment privilege is in effect at the station
house, the "standards of Johnson were ...

found to be a necessary

prerequisite to a finding of a valid waiver." 163 In view of the development that Johnson has undergone in the right to trial and
right to counsel contexts, this language can easily be relied upon
to require that a suspect be informed of the precise nature of the
charges about which he is being questioned as a prerequisite to
waiver of his Miranda rights.
Other elements of the Court's recent analysis of the concept
of waiver, however, could be used to support an opposite result.
In Schneckloth, the Court indicated that two considerations are of
particular importance in determining the applicable standard of
waiver: first, the extent to which the right at stake bears upon the
integrity of the factfinding process; 164 second, the degree of structure that inheres in the context in which the waiver is sought.1 65
Either of these considerations could be utilized to dilute the applicable standard of waiver in the Miranda context. Compared to
the courtroom environment in which the rights to counsel and jury
trial are waived, the custodial interrogation setting is relatively un16 0

See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (right to trial); Minor v.
United States, 375 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967) (waiver
of trial counsel).
16, In the case of waiver of the right to trial, it has been held that the defendant must demonstrate a clear understanding of the charges against him. Henderson
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). In addition, the defendant must have a "full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). When the defendant waives his right to counsel,
he must understand not only the charges and statutory offenses against him, but also
the possible punishments, defenses, and mitigating circumstances, and any facts

"essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter." Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (plurality opinion) (Black, .). See generally Note,
The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MNN. L. BEv. 1133,
1141-45 (1965).

U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. 240.
164 Id. 242.
162412
163

165Id.

243-45.

For a critical examination of this aspect of Schnecldoth, see

Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 473, 477-80 (1978).

19791

POLICE TRICKERY IN INDUCING CONFESSIONS

structured. In light of its analysis in Schneckloth, the Court may
find that it is "unrealistic" to impose additional requirements beyond delivery of the Miranda warnings. 16 Moreover, although
Schneckloth properly recognized that the Miranda rights do have a
bearing upon the determination of guilt or innocence, 67 other postMiranda decisions evince a perception on the part of the Court that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be introduced into
evidence without jeopardizing the integrity of the factfinding
process.6 8 Therefore, in keeping with the doctrine of variable
waiver articulated in Schneckloth 169 the Court might be expected
to hold that a suspect may validly waive his rights under Miranda
even though he was not informed of the precise nature of the charges
forming the subject matter of the interrogation.
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately holds that disclosure of
the charge is not a prerequisite to a valid waiver of Mirandarights,
however, this will not mean that after obtaining a valid waiver
without such disclosure, police officers may then misrepresent the
seriousness of the charge in order to eliminate any remaining resistance in the suspect. Because the Mirandarights must be capable
of reassertion at any point in the interrogation process, 170 the mere
existence of a waiver does not immunize subsequent police misrepresentation. On the contrary, misrepresentation of the seriousness
of the charge cripples the suspect's capacity to reassess the desirability of asserting the rights outlined in the warnings. The presence of inaccurate information about the legal consequences that
will accompany ill-considered speech achieves as pernicious an effect
as direct distortion of the Miranda warnings. Although many
doubtlessly constitutional methods of police trickery distort the
suspect's perception of his predicament, it is sophistry to make rigid
distinctions between the suspect's abstract understanding of his legal
rights and his concrete ability to make effective use of them. Prin166 In most cases, of course, it would not be any more difficult for the police

to inform the suspect of the charges they are investigating than it is for them to
deliver the warnings required by Miranda. There might be some cases, however, in
which defining the precise nature of the charges under investigation would be difficult. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tatro, 76 Mass. App. Ct Adv. Sh. 568, 346
N.E.2d 724 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (homicide charges not contemplated at time
accused was questioned about robbery because cause of victim's death had not yet
been determined).
16 7 See Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973): "The [Miranda]
Court made it clear that the basis for decision was the need to protect the fairness
of the trial itself...."
168 See, e.g., Hass v. Oregon, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971).
369 See text accompanying notes 164 & 165 supra.
170 See note 28 supra & accompanying text.
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cipled resolution of this problem requires some analysis of the significance of the particular factual distortion in terms of the suspect's
ability to exercise the Miranda rights.
Whatever balance a court would strike in other areas, the effect
of misrepresentation of the charge cannot be overestimated. If
suspects ever engage in the type of rational deliberation implicit in a
system that depends on warnings, it is a virtual certainty that their
perception of the potential punishment will assume critical importance in deciding whether or not to confess. Indeed, with the
exception of deception about whether interrogation is taking
place,1 71 it is difficult to imagine trickery that exerts a more devastating effect on the suspect's ability to utilize his constitutional rights
meaningfully. By distorting the suspect's understanding of his
legal predicament, police misrepresentation of the charge is very
likely to dissipate the effect of the Miranda warnings substantially.
It therefore creates an unacceptable risk that the suspect will not be
able to exercise his constitutional rights effectively. Accordingly,
trickery of this type should be impermissible per se.
D. "A Pretended FriendIs Worse": 172 The Assumption of
Non-Adversary Roles by InterrogatingOfficers
According to Royal and Schutt's treatise on police interrogation, "[r]esistance to the disclosure of [incriminating] information is
considerably increased . . .if something is not done to establish a

friendly and trusting attitude on the part of the subject." 173 Accordingly, the interrogating officer will often assume a non-adversarial role in which the suspect will perceive him not as an officer
who is attempting to elicit incriminating information, but rather
See notes 119-49 supra & accompanying text.
Both Spano and Leyra v.
172 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), lend some preliminary support to the conclusion advanced in this section. In both cases the Court invalidated confessions obtained by
police interrogators who purported to speak to the defendants in a non-adversarial
capacity. In Leyra, the police psychiatrist who obtained the confession told the
defendant he was a doctor who was going to help him with his headaches. 347
U.S. at 559. In Spano, a police officer told defendant (who had been his childhood
friend) that his job would be in jeopardy if the defendant did not confess, and that
loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife, and his unborn
child. 360 U.S. at 323. Although the Court clearly expressed its disapproval of the
deceptive practice employed, id., it considered the use of the childhood friend as
just "another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation," id., and
held that this practice combined with other factors in the case to overbear defendants will, id. Thus, the Court did not go so far as to indicate that the deceptive
practice alone was sufficient to invalidate the confession.
73
3 F. RoAr & S. ScHuTT, supra note 2, at 61-62, quoted in Kamisar, supra note
111, at 209.
171
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as a friend or counsellor who is truely concerned with the suspect's
welfare.1 7 4 For example, in State v. Reilly,17 5 the chief interrogating
officer manipulated the situation so that the eighteen year old
suspect would view the officer almost as a father figure. 176 In State
v. Biron, 177 one of the interrogating officers assumed the role of
religious counsellor by speaking to the suspect as a fellow Catholic
and enlightening him about the values of confession. 78 Similar
174 This tactic is closely related to deception about whether an interrogation is
taking place. See notes 119-50 supra & accompanying text. Although the assumption of a non-adversarial role may not totally negate the suspect's awareness that he
is the subject of a police interrogation, the effective employment of this stratagem
will substantially diminish his perception that particular questions are in fact part
of the interrogation.
175No. 5285 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 12, 1974), vacated, 32 Conn. Supp. 349,
355 A.2d 324 (Super. Ct. 1976). See J. BnmTHEL, A DzAa nT CAxAAN (1976).
This excellent account of the murder case in which Peter Reilly was convicted of
manslaughter but eventually exonerated contains substantial portions of the taperecorded police interrogation of Reilly. See id. 39-130.
176 See, e.g., id. 85:
S: [interrogator]: Have you ever felt close enough to someone that
you could really trust them?
P: (suspect]: Nope . . . yes, excuse me. I do have someone that I
could speak to like that. That would be Aldo Beligni.
S: Let's you and I try something. You try to feel about me...
P: Like a father?
S: Like somebody who's really interested in you, and then . ..
P: Well, I do already. That's why I come out with all this.
177 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963).
A six-hour tape recording of the
interrogation conducted in Biron is on file in the libraries of the University of
Michigan and University of Minnesota Schools of Law [hereinafter referred to as
Biron Tapes]. The case is discussed in Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of
Being Guilty," 68 J. CnRa. L. & C. 182, 184, 185 nn.19 & 20 (1977). The author
expresses his gratitude to Professor Kamisar for making portions of the tapes available
to the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
178 Actually, it might be more accurate to say that the officer attempted to
assume the role of a priest-figure. Excerpts from the tape disclose that after the.
suspect asked to see a priest, Hawkinson, an interrogator who had previously exhibited courtesy and restraint in his dealings with the suspect, entered and the
interrogation proceeded as follows:
H: Mike was telling me that you'd like to see a priest. Is that true?
S: Yes.
H: I'm Catholic, too. I can appreciate that. Any particular one that
you'd like to see?
S: No.
H: I think you realize you'll feel a lot betterS: Yeah, that's true.
H: If you did do it, and you tell about it. I think you know that.
It's just like when you go to confession, if you make a good clean
confession, well, you feel good, received the next morning. My
name is Hawkinson but I am a Catholic, a convert many years
ago. In fact this Sunday night, Irm going out to King's house on
a retreat for tvo days.
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examples of a role switch appear, or are at least hinted at 179 in
many other cases. 8 0
In some cases, the suspect's perception of the officer as a
friendly figure will create extreme pressures to confess. In the
Reilly case, for example, it is apparent that the suspect's inordinate
desire to gain the acceptance of the interrogator whom he perceived
as a father figure 181 compelled him not only to make a statement,
but also to try with pathetic eagerness to confess to those details
that he sensed the police were seeking. 8 2 In light of this example, 83 it may be concluded that when the interrogator's shift
to a non-adversary role is highly effective or when the suspect is
179 In cases such as Reilly, Biron, and State v. Miller, 76 N.J.' 392, 388 A.2d
218 (1978), see note 180 infra, in which the interrogation is actually recorded,
examples of an interrogating officer's switch to a non-adversary role are much more
apparent than in non-recorded cases. This tends to support Professor Kamisar's
argument that our traditional litigational tools are simply not calculated to elicit all
of the constitutionally relevant facts of secret police interrogation. See Kamisar,
supra note 111.
180 See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1966) (defendant confessed immediately after officer who was friend of family said a short prayer on his
behalf); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant urged to confess by
officer who had in fact been a boyhood friend); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388
A.2d 218 (1978) (officer told defendant that the murderer was not a criminal who
deserved punishment, but a person in need of medical care, and that he would do
all he could to help if the defendant spoke about the incident). Cf. State v.
Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975), modified, 428 U.S. 908 (1976)
(defendant's father, who was a police sergeant, urged defendant to cooperate with
sheriff during interrogation on murder charges).

181 The extent of Reilly's feeling of dependence was fully revealed when he
twice inquired of the interrogator if there was a possibility that he might come to
live with the officer and his family, J. BARTEL, supra note 175, at 98, 117-18, 127.
182 See, e.g., id. 83, 91:
S: What about a knife, Pete? Remember using a knife?
P: I don't, but a straight razor thing registers.
S: And a knife, Pete.
P: Maybe.

Could you give me the details? . . .

I mean, was there a knife mark?
S: Pete, you know very well why I won't answer that question. 'Cause
you're not being honest . . . . You're trying to maneuver me and
trick me into telling you facts that you already know. I know the
facts.
P: Well, if you would give me some hints ....
183 The after-discovered evidence that led to the ultimate dismissal of Reilly's
case appears to establish conclusively that his confession was false. See Reilly v.
State, 32 Conn. Supp. 349, -, 355 A.2d 324, 333-39 (Super. Ct. 1976), vacating
No. 5285 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 12, 1974). Moreover, during the course of the
interrogation, Reilly said that he must have raped his mother, id. 119, a statement
that was patently false because no rape was alleged to have occurred.
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extraordinarily sensitive to such tactics, a real danger exists that
84
the shift will induce a false confession.
The more pervasive danger, however, is that the interrogator's
assumption of a non-adversary role will negate the effect of the
second Miranda warning. The point of telling the suspect that
anything he says can be used against him is to sharpen the suspect's
awareness of his position. As the Miranda majority stated: "[T]his
warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that
he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not
in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest." 185 As Royal
and Schutt suggest, 3 6 when the police effectively assume a nonadversarial role, the essential awareness is likely to be dissipated.
The suspect's belief that he is talking to a friend or counsellor who
has his best interests at heart will cause the suspect to forget that he
is involved in an adversary interrogation in which his constitutional
protections are of vital importance.187 Accordingly, in order to
avoid this negation of the protection provided by the second
Miranda warning, the device of seeking to elicit incriminating
information through the assumption of a non-adversarial role
should be barred. 8 8
E. Tricks That Take on the Character of
Threats or Promises
In an early interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege,
the Court concluded that one category of police tactics will automatically render a resulting confession involuntary. In 1897, the
Supreme Court in Brain v. United States s9 laid down the rule that
in order to be free and voluntary within the meaning of the fifth
amendment privilege, a confession must be one that was "not...
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any
184 Under Professor Kamisar's analysis, such a danger should in itself operate

to render "involuntary" all confessions induced as a result of this particular stratagem.
See Involuntary Confessions, supra note 87, at 753-55.
185 384 U.S. at 469.
186 See text accompanying notes 172 & 173 supra.
1871d.

467-69.

188 If it is determined that the suspect (given his characteristics that are known

to the police) would be likely to view the interrogating officer as a friend, fatherfigure, religious counselor, or any other non-adversarial figure, this per se rule would
be violated. The fact that the officer was actually manifesting his true concern for
the suspect would, of course, be constitutionally irrelevant because the officer's bona
fides would not mitigate the potential destruction of the protections afforded by
Miranda. See note 115 supra.
189 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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direct or implied promises, however slight." 190 Although the
Brain rule originally applied only to the federal government, 191 the
Supreme Court explicitly noted in Brady v. United States 19 2 that
Malloy v. Hogan's 193 incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege
made it fully applicable to the states. 194
The Bram doctrine's impact on deceptive police practices depends, of course, upon the interpretation given to the terms "threats"
and "promises." Under a broad interpretation of these terms,
many police interrogation tactics might be held to constitute implicit threats or promises in the sense that their objective is to make
the suspect believe that his situation will be improved in some way
if he does confess, or that it will become worse if he does not. On
the other hand, some lower courts have been quite adept at interpreting Brain in a narrow way that virtually strips the doctrine of
its vitality. 195 In view of the Court's reaffirmation of Brain in
Brady v. United States,196 principled application of the doctrine is
necessary.
Interpretation of the Brain doctrine depends upon two interrelated and particularly difficult questions. The first concerns the
extent to which the terms of a promise or threat must be articulated;
the second involves specification of the type of detriments or bene-

fits that legitimately may be offered to a suspect. Both problems
present themselves in a variety of contexts. For example, the
Miranda opinion describes a deceptive practice recommended by
the O'Hara manual: "The accused is placed in a line-up, but this
time he is identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims who
associated him with different offenses. It is expected that the subject will become desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations." 197 In this
190 Id.

542-43.

191 In state cases, post-Brain confessions that were clearly given in exchange
for direct promises of leniency by the police were found not to be in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)
(confession held voluntary when given in exchange for promise that accused's
father would be released from jail and brother would not be disciplined for parole
violation).
192 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

193378 U.S. 1 (1964).
194 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
195 See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 908 (1967) (confession voluntary when obtained after federal agent told
accused that he would probably be released on reduced bail if he cooperated).
196 397 U.S. at 754. See text accompanying notes 213 & 214 infra.
'97 C. O'HAnA, FUNDAmNTAS OF CarIMNAL INVESTIGATmON 105-06 (1956),
quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453 (1966).
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situation, because the police make no statement of any kind to the
suspect, one could argue that no express or implied threat has been
made. Nevertheless, the purpose of the charade is clear. In effect,
the police say to the suspect, "Confess to the crime you are charged
with, or you will find yourself being prosecuted for crimes that you
did not commit." 198

The interrogation of John Biron 199 included a number of instances in which the benefits of confessing (or detriments of not
confessing) were suggested but not clearly delineated. Biron was an
eighteen year old youth who was accused of participating in a felony
murder with one or two other teenagers. At one point, one of the
interrogating officers said to him: "The thing you want to remember is that there's two of you involved and you're both to blame.
But if you don't tell the truth, and the other one does, it puts more
blame on your part." 200 Another officer employed a metaphor to
make essentially the same point:
Right up to your ears you're implicated. That hole is
getting bigger, you're digging it deeper. You're the fellow
who's going to determine how long you're going to be
buried. .

.

.

You're the one guy who's got the shovel;

you're the one fellow who's digging the hole. You just
figure out how deep you want to dig that hole, how far
down you want to bury yourself; and you just keep right
on digging. Of course, if you would start telling the truth,
a little of that dirt back in, and make it a
we could throw201
little shallower.
Although neither officer referred specifically to the suspect's legal
liability, it appears that the first officer's reference to "blame" was
not limited to moral culpability, and the significance of the second
officer's metaphor is obvious. The impression created by these
officers was that the suspect would maximize his time of incarceration if he did not confess, but might obtain a reduced sentence if
he did.
In other situations, the police may attempt to induce a confession by offering the possibility of benefits that do not involve reduc198 A study of interrogation practices in New Haven indicated that the police
have conveyed this same type of message to suspects in post-Miranda cases. Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YAT E L.J. 1519, 1546 (1967)
thereinafter cited as Interrogationsin New Haven].
199 See notes 177-80 supra & accompanying text.
2 0
Biron Tapes, supra note 177.
201 Id.
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tion of legal liability. The benefits offered the suspect may be
tangible, such as an opportunity to talk with one's spouse 20 2 or a
chance to receive medical treatment, 20 3 or intangible, such as an
assuagement of guilt feelings or a promise of greater respect from
the interrogating officer. In the Biron interrogation, for example,
one officer continually urged the suspect to "get it off [his] chest"
in order to "feel better." 204 The same officer repeatedly told the
youth, first by implication, and then explicitly, that the officer
would "respect [the suspect] a lot more" if he "told the truth." 205
In determining the appropriate scope of the Brain doctrine,
the doctrine's underlying rationale must be explored. As Justice
White implied in Brady v. United States206 and as Justice Harlan
noted in his dissent in Miranda v. Arizona,20 7 Brain reflects a judgment that certain types of threats or promises are likely to "apply
a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his
capacity to make a rational choice." 208 In the case of threats or
promises of the type involved in Brain (i.e., those that relate to the
suspect's status in the criminal justice system), 209 the basis for this
judgment is not difficult to perceive-it is simply improper for the
police to place a price tag on the right to remain silent in a context
in which the bargain offered to the suspect is likely to prove il1u2 2
0 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession held involuntary
when suspect was held incommunicado for 16 hours, and police refused to allow
him to talk to his wife unless he confessed).
203
See United States ex rel. Collins v. Maroney, 287 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) (statement by narcotics addict in withdrawal held involuntary when given
after promise of treatment by physician).
2
o4 Biron Tapes, supra note 177.
205 Id. Remarks of this type may be improper because they tend to place the
officer in a non-adversarial role, see text accompanying notes 172-88 supra, or
because they are implicit attacks on the suspect's dignity, see text accompanying
notes 243-48 infra.
206397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
207384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966)
4
208 Id. 507 & n. (quoting Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 34, at 73).
209
In Bram, the accused was told by a detective that another crewman had
seen him commit the murder, 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897), and that he should tell the
detective if he had an accomplice in order to avoid "[having] the blame of this
horrible crime on your own shoulders." Id. 564. The Court interpreted the first
of these statements as a threat, and the second as an offer of a benefit. See Dix,
supra note 57, at 288-89.
It is not always impermissible for the government to offer a legal benefit in exchange for a decision not to exercise a constitutional right. For instance, the court's
legitimization of plea bargaining allows this type of bargain to be struck when a
defendant's right to trial is at issue. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
753-54 (1970). See generally Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney,
and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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sory. 210 Moreover, this type of pressure is likely to exert substantial
influence upon the suspect's will. Although the bargain may in fact
be illusory, the stress engendered by the custodial interrogation
setting is likely to diminish significantly the suspect's ability to
evaluate its worth. In some cases, this kind of pressure could very
easily cause an innocent person to confess, 211 and in any case, such
tactics materially increase the likelihood that an ensuing decision to
confess will be a result of this outside pressure rather than a consequence of a rational decision stemming from the suspect's own inner
motives.
Because of these considerations, the Brain doctrine should
apply whether or not the threat or promise is explicitly articulated,
as long as the police suggestion is likely to induce a suspect to
believe that his legal position (in terms of potential charges, periods
of incarceration, or collateral consequences pertaining to his relationship with the criminal justice system) 212 will improve if he
confesses or deteriorate if he remains silent. A police statement
to the suspect that by "telling the truth" he can "throw a little dirt
back in the hole and make it shallower" distorts the suspect's decisionmaking process no less than a direct statement that he will
spend less time in prison if he confesses. In fact, the former type
of statement may have greater impact. The sinister implications
of the suggestive metaphor may infuse the suspect's situation with
added terror and further decrease the probability of a rational determination of whether he wants to make a particular statement.
210

Promises made in the context of custodial interrogation are likely to prove
illusory because an unaided suspect lacks the capacity to evaluate the actual value
of any express or implied commitment made by the police. Thus, in Brady, the
Court distinguished plea bargaining from the Brain doctrine on the ground that, in
the former case, the defendant is represented by an attorney who can fully advise
him of the value of any bargain offered. See note 196 supra. It should be noted
that, based on this rationale, the Brain doctrine might not apply to a situation in
which a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation is in fact represented by counsel.
211 This is especially true when, as is often the case, the implied promise of
leniency is combined with police assurance that the suspect has little chance of
escaping conviction if he goes to trial. For example, in the Biron case, the police
repeatedly told the suspect not only that they knew he was guilty, see text accompanying notes 217 & 218 infra, but also that he would be found guilty (because he
would be unable to convince a judge and jury of his innocencel), and then suggested
to him that he might be able to escape trial as an adult if he confessed. See Biron
Tapes, supra note 177. Confronted with this choice of alternatives, an innocent
suspect might very reasonably decide that it would be in his best interest to confess.
212 E.g., a promise that the suspect's bail will be set at a lower figure in the
event he makes an incriminating statement. See United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d
16, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 908 (1967) (distinguishing Bram, court
held confession obtained after a promise of reduced bail voluntary under all the
circumstances). Empirical evidence indicates that this type of inducement is offered
to suspects quite frequently. See Interrogations in New Haven, supra note 198,
at 1545.
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The extent to which the Bram rule should be extended to prohibit threats or promises that do not touch upon the suspect's legal
status is problematic. Even when the inducement has little or no
bearing on the suspect's relationship to the criminal justice system,
pressures of coercive magnitude may be created. It is indisputable,
however, that not all threats and promises carry the same risk of
constitutional infirmity. Police tactics that take on the character of
threats or promises obviously occur in a multiplicity of forms. In
addition, the impact of the tactics varies widely with the sensitivity
of the suspect and the strength of the particular inducement. In
view of these factors, and because the suggested per se approach
calls for a delineation of relatively specific practices that create an
unacceptable risk of constitutional deprivation, one might argue
that a literal reading of the Brain rule is inappropriate.
The rejection of a per se rule for this type of deception can
only be justified, however, if the alternative-the totality of the circumstances test-offers meaningful protection against impermissibly
coercive threats and promises. Justice White's majority opinion in
Brady v. United States suggests that the Bram rule reflects a judgment that the totality of the circumstances test is unworkable in
this context. In Brady, the Court upheld the validity of a guilty
plea in a situation in which exercise of the right to trial would
have subjected the defendant to the possibility of the death penalty.
Distinguishing Brain, the Court emphasized that the presence of
counsel could dissipate "the possibly coercive impact of a promise
of leniency." 213 The majority explicitly endorsed the Bram rationale, however, in language that bordered on describing it as a
per se rule:
Brain is not inconsistent with our holding. .

.

.

Brain

dealt with a confession given by a suspect in custody, alone
and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances,
even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to
bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal
act as such, but because defendants at such times are too
on them
sensitive to inducement and the possible impact
2 14
too great to ignore and too difficult to assess.
Although Justice White's reference to "leniency" might imply
that he was limiting his analysis to promises that relate to the suspect's status within the criminal justice system, his conclusion con213

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).

214 Id.
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cerning the unworkability of the totality of the circumstances test
cannot be limited to promises of that character. Promises and
threats involving tangible benefit and detriment obviously vary in
terms of coercive effect, as do promises of leniency. Although many
promises and threats are less coercive than "even a mild promise of
leniency," the difficulty of assessing the effect on the suspect subjected to the interrogation suggests that with respect to this issue
the totality of the circumstances test does not provide effective protection for the suspect's constitutional rights.
In addition to the concerns expressed by Justice White in
Brady, no apparent societal interest supporting the use of threats
and promises during interrogation is sufficiently compelling to justify the painstaking effort required by the totality of the circumstances test. It is by no means dear that the employment of such
tactics achieves law enforcement gains that outweigh the coercive
effects that are engendered. In the context of a type of deception
that has a variable likely effect, unless some significant societal interest in such police conduct exists, the suspect's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is betterprotected by a per se rule.
In summary, although threats and promises of tangible benefits
made by police during interrogation in order to elicit a confession
vary significantly in terms of coercive effect, they are properly the
subject of a per se proscription.
When the police merely suggest to the suspect that a confession
will make him feel better or cause them to respect him more, there
is no reason to exclude the confession as involuntary. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Brain indicated that a confession probably would
not be invalidated if the benefit that induced it "was that of the
removal from the conscience of the prisoner of the merely moral
weight resulting from concealment." 216 This judgment is proper.
Within our constitutional framework, confessions that stem from
inner pressures such as a desire to relieve one's conscience or a desire
to be respected are clearly voluntary. 16 The fact that police trickery may play a part in magnifying these pressures is not in itself
sufficient basis to conclude that such tactics should be forbidden on
a per se basis. In such cases, it is preferable to employ traditional
voluntariness methodology to exclude the relatively rare confessions
that are the result of impermissible coercion.
215 168 U.S. at 564.
(plurality opinion)
216 Cf. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576 (1961)
(Frankfurter, .): "However, a confession made by a person in custody is not
always the result of an overborne will. The police may be midwife to a declaration
naturally born of remorse, or relief, or desperation, or calculation."
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F. Repeated Assurances That the Suspect Is
Known To Be Guilty
In the Biron interrogation, one of the interrogators prefaced
his questioning by saying, "I suppose they've told you what you're
suspected of doing: What we already know that you've done." 217
The device of impressing the suspect with the interrogators' certainty of his guilt was continually employed throughout the interrogation. 21 In view of the recommendations contained in the
police manuals, this is hardly surprising. One of the principal directives in the Inbau-Reid manual is that the interrogator should
"Display an Air of Confidence in the Subject's Guilt." 219 In
elaborating, the authors note that "[a]t various times during the
interrogation the subject should be reminded that the investigation
has established the fact that he committed the offense; that there
is no doubt about it; and that, moreover, his general behavior
plainly shows that he is not now telling the truth." 220
In justifying this technique, the authors state that it is "not apt
to induce a confession of guilt from an innocent subject." 221 However, Professor Driver's examination of social psychological data
casts doubt upon this assertion. The evidence indicates that "when
an individual finds himself disagreeing with the unanimous judgment of others regarding an unambiguous stimulus, he may yield to
the majority even though this requires misreporting what he sees or
believes." 222 The psychological pressures of custodial interrogation
undoubtedly weaken the defenses of many criminal suspects. 223 A
significant danger exists that, confronted with positive assurances of
their guilt from authority figures 224 who appear to have a full
knowledge of the facts, 225 they will not only "yield to the majority

judgment," but adopt the facts that are suggested to them.2 2 6
217Biron Tapes, supra note 177 (emphasis added).

218 Id.
219 F. INBAU & J.
220 Id.

REIn,

supra note 2, at 26-31.

28.
221 Id. 29.
222 Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HIAv. L.
PEv. 42, 51-52 (1968).
223 See id. 60.
224The police manuals advise the interrogating officers to try to appear to the
suspects as figures who command respect. See, e.g., F. INBAU & J. REIn, supra
note 2, at 18.
225 Id. 13-17.
226
See Driver, supra note 222, at 51-53. State v. Reilly, No. 5285 (Conn.
Super. Ct. April 12, 1974), vacated, 32 Conn. Supp. 349, 355 A.2d 324 (Super. Ct.
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Moreover, the repeated assurances of the suspect's guilt are expressly designed to impress upon him the futility of resistance. 22 7
In effect, the suspect is being told, "We know you are guilty; so
why not admit it?" In identifying the coercive attributes of the
228
interrogation techniques employed in Culombe v. Connecticut,
Justice Frankfurter particularly emphasized the fact that the interrogating officers continually impressed upon the defendant that their
sole purpose was to obtain a confession of guilt,22 9 thus indicating

a judgment that this type of pressure is likely to have a particularly
debilitating effect on the suspect. The cumulative pressures of
custodial interrogation and repeated assurances of the suspect's guilt
are of sufficient magnitude to justify the conclusion that they create
an unacceptable risk of an involuntary confession. Accordingly,
the use of this tactic should be forbidden per se.
G. The "Mutt and Jeff" Routine
One of the classic deceptive practices recommended in the
police manuals is the so-called "Mutt and Jeff" routine. Although
this routine has many variations, its basic elements are simple. Jeff,
the friendly interrogator, begins the questioning. After Jeff employs a friendly, sympathetic approach for a period of time, Mutt
(the unfriendly interrogator) appears and "berate[s] the subject." 230
Jeff then resumes his sympathetic approach.2 31 The act may be
developed in various ways: the two interrogators may stage an argument in front of the suspect; 232 the suggestion may be made that
the suspect will be left with Mutt if he does not cooperate with
Jeff; 233 or the same interrogator may assume both roles.23 4 One
important element common to all the variations, however, is that
Mutt will display hostility towards the suspect and make demeaning
comments about him. In one variation, the Mutt character may
1976), provides a striking example of this phenomenon. After the police repeatedly
told him they knew he did it, see, e.g., J. BArHEL, supra note 175, at 84, he at one
point unequivocally adopted the details that they suggested to him. Id. 124.
2
27 F. INBAu & J. REm, supra note 2, at 30.
228367 U.S. 568 (1961).
229 Id. 631 (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.). The same factor was identified
as potentially coercive in earlier cases. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
323-24 (1959); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945).
2
30 F. INBAU & J. RErn, supra note 2, at 62.
231 Id. 63.
232 Id. 62.
2 33
See C. O'HaL, supra note 197, at 104, quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 452 (1966).
234 F. INRAu & J. REm, supra note 2, at 62.
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refer to the suspect "as a rather despicable character." 235 Alternatively, if the same interrogator acts out both roles, he may "get up
from his chair" and address the suspect as follows: "Joe, I thought
that there was something basically decent and honorable in you but
apparently there isn't. The hell with it, if that's the way you want
to leave it; I don't give a damn." 236
By labelling one variant of the Mutt and Jeff routine as an
interrogation "ploy," 237 and then condemning the use of "patent
psychological ploys," 238 the Miranda majority implied that the use
of this strategy may be inherently coercive. Such a judgment could
stem from the implications of Mutt's hostility.2 39 After Jeff, his
only ally, deserts him, a real risk arises that Mutt's angry statements
will be perceived by the suspect as a threat of physical mistreatment.240

In evaluating the significance of this risk, the context in

which the hostility is exhibited must be considered. A suspect who
has already spent some time in the debilitating atmosphere of the
police station growing increasingly anxious about his fate, is confronted by an authority figure who with obvious hostility conveys
to him the message that he is "no good." What visions might this
raise in the mind of the already frightened suspect? The suspect
does not know that the police will not mistreat him. He does know
that he is within their absolute control and that they have the
capacity to hurt him in many ways. When he hears an apparently
angry officer voice the opinion that he is worthless, it requires little
imagination for him to conclude that the officer will treat him in
accordance with this estimation. Inbau and Reid assert that Mutt's
beration of the suspect helps induce a confession because Jeff's
sympathetic treatment becomes more effective. 241 The increased
effectiveness of Jeff's treatment, however, can be attributed to the
suspect's desire to avoid any further dealings with Mutt and the
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0Inbau and Reid take pains to note that "the second (unfriendly) interrogator should resort only to verbal condemnation of the subject; under no circumstances should he ever employ physical abuse or threats of abuse or other mistreatment." F. INBhU & J. BRm, supra note 2, at 63. However, the authors'
inclusion of this warning at this point is in itself significant-it reveals a recognition
that when a police officer verbally abuses a suspect, there is a substantial danger that

to the suspect the abuse may take on the attributes of a threat.
241F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at 63.
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threat that his manner portends.2 42 In short, the risk that the
suspect will perceive a threat of mistreatment in Mutt's display of
hostility is simply too great to tolerate.
A second reason exists for prohibiting the use of this tactic.
The intimidating potential of the Mutt and Jeff routine is magnified by the demeaning message that it conveys to the suspect: "You
are no good unless you confess." Significantly, Inbau and Reid
conclude that the most effective variation on the Mutt and Jeff
theme occurs when the same officer enacts both roles.243 When an
officer who has offered friendship and support to the suspect suddenly changes his mind, and tells him that he is not a decent person, the impact on the suspect's ability to resist police efforts to
induce a confession is likely to be significant.
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Professor Driver's
survey of the psychological evidence indicates that the procedures
of arrest and detention can temporarily induce shame and humiliation in nearly anyone, 24 and will create strong pressure to assuage
those feelings.2 45 If this is true, interrogation practices that exacerbate those feelings, and suggest that only confession can alleviate them, undoubtedly exert extreme pressure on the suspect's
decisionmaking process. When the demeaning message is conveyed
with the potent force of the Mutt and Jeff technique, a significant
likelihood exists that an involuntary confession will be the result.
Given the implicit threat of force and the potentially coercive challenge to dignity that the Mutt and and Jeff routine fosters, it is
reasonable to conclude that it should be the subject of a per se
proscription.
Although the Mutt and Jeff routine is a particularly coercive interrogation tactic and not all challenges to the suspect's
honor or dignity will result in the same level of coercion, the use
by law enforcement officers of any tactic that challenges a sus24 2
The Reilly case contains an example of the "Mutt and Jeff" routine with the
chief interrogating officer acting out both roles. After Reilly stated that he was
really not sure of the facts he was admitting, the interrogator, who was previously
-friendly and supportive, see, e.g., note 176 supra, said to Reilly:
O.K. I don't want you to play any more headgames with us. And if you
want to play this way, we'll take you and lock you up and treat you like
an animal . . . . And I think it's about time that you sat up in that
chair and you faced us like a man and you realize that trying to talk to
two state policemen like they're two goddamn idiots, it's not gonna work.
J. BtAnTs., supra note 175, at 109.
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pect's honor or dignity raises a fundamental question for our
system of criminal justice. Despite the rudimentary development
of a fairness component in voluntariness doctrine,2 46 the Supreme
Court has never explicitly endorsed the very basic proposition that
criminal suspects have a right to be treated in a manner that reflects
a concern for their dignity as human beings. It appears, however,
that a basic postulate of the fifth amendment is a concern for protecting the dignity of the individual. 247 Interrogation tactics that
are calculated to make the suspect feel that he is not a decent or
honorable person unless he confesses constitute direct assaults upon
that dignity. More than thirty years ago, the Court intimated that
stripping a suspect of his clothes in order to induce a confession
was impermissible.2 48 In light of our increased sensitivity to the
effect of psychological tactics, practices that are calculated to strip
individuals of their self-respect should be equally objectionable.
Accordingly, such interrogation techniques should be barred as inherently unfair.
IV. CONCLUSION

Without coherent guidelines, the conscientious interrogating
officer who wants to comply with the law but still be effective in
properly securing admissible confessions is placed in an impossible
position. The deceptive practices recommended by the police manuals are undoubtedly effective, and, based on existing case law, few,
if any, of them are clearly illegal. On the other hand, the permissibility of police trickery may not be determined solely by asking
whether the trickery in question is likely to induce an unreliable
confession, as the manuals suggest. The protections provided by the
Miranda warnings, the sixth amendment right to an attorney, and
the modern version of the "voluntariness" test limit the types of
deceptive practices that the police may employ. This Article has
attempted to demonstrate that effective protection of these constitutional rights can only be achieved through the formulation of per
se rules-that is, whenever the practice under scrutiny creates an
unacceptable risk that the ordinary suspect's constitutional rights
will be infringed, the practice should be proscribed. Application
of this analysis to several widely employed interrogation tactics re2 46

See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
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suits in a finding that they should be absolutely prohibited. Although the development and application of such guidelines will
249
undoubtedly challenge the institutional competence of the courts,
vigorous judicial scrutiny of police trickery in interrogation is essential if the criminal justice system is truly to operate within constitutional confines.
24 9

The adoption of this approach will undoubtedly require procedural in-

novation to insure its effective implementation.
Most significantly, Professor
Kamisar's suggestion of mandatory recording of police interrogations should be
adopted. See Kamisar, supra note 111, at 236-43.

